Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and
Local Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case In Point by Wigfall Robinson, Mildred
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 
Volume 35
2002 
Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy at 
the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The 
Property Tax as a Case In Point 
Mildred Wigfall Robinson 
University of Virginia 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr 
 Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Rule of Law Commons, State and Local 
Government Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and Local Fiscal Policy at the 
Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property Tax as a Case In Point, 35 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 511 (2002). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol35/iss3/3 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING COHERENT STATE AND
LOCAL FISCAL POLICY AT THE INTERSECTION OF
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND REPUBLICANISM:
THE PROPERTY TAX AS A CASE IN POINT t
Mildred Wigfall Robinson*
Professor Robinson explores the uneasiness present when acts of "direct democ-
racy" through means of voter referenda and ballot initiatives conflict with the
ideals of representative government, using fiscal matters, such as the property tax,
as an example.
Part I explores the changes that have taken place in the last two decades in voter
strategy and in patterns of judicial interpretation, briefly reviewing the history of
the property tax focusing on taxpayer reaction to long overdue attempts at admin-
istrative reform, and showing how that effort indirectly contributed to the
"taxpayer revolt. "It further examines how and why broad-scale attempts to utilize
non-tax sources of revenue to maintain services were largely unsuccessful. It also
briefly explore the extent to which change tracks voter sentiment. Lastly, it traces
the expansion of voter activism to taxes in addition to the property tax, noting the
parallel emergence of two additional tactics: the imposition of required super-
majority action--either electoral or legislative-to validate any generic tax
increase and the enactment of revenue caps.
Part H of the Article highlights initiatives' patterns of departure from desirable
fiscal policy identifying those factors inherent in ballot-box activity that make it
difficult, if not impossible, to be attentive to such factors. It shows how legislative
activity can accommodate fiscal policy as well as social policy while exercising
taxing and spending authority and contrasts the initiative process showing why
deliberate attentive response to underlying policy and competing considerations is
impossible. It argues that this voter seizure of control significantly forecloses the
subsequent possibility of competent long-term legislative financial oversight (i.e.
budget-making) in general and then argues that the initiative process impedes the
formation and effective interaction of political coalitions on either side of or
across the aisle possibly causing disenfranchisement in some cases. Voter control
ultimately undermines the efficacy of government in general to everyone's detri-
ment.
t © 2002. All rights reserved.
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Lastly, Part III, explores whether expressions of popular will with regard to fiscal
matters can ever be infused into representative government without unduly dilut-
ing the former and crippling the latter Assuming that repeal of the process is
politically impossible, Professor Robinson suggests steps that might be taken by the
Courts, by legislative bodies, and by the voters themselves to make the initiative
process contribute to rather than trump representative government.
Taxes are what we pay for civilized society.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'
Taxation is, in fact, the most difficult function of government and
that against which their citizens are most apt to be refractory.
Thomas Jefferson
2
Over the last few decades, there has been a sea change in the
lawmaking process in this country. By initiative and by referen-
3 4dum, American voters in a significant number of states are
participating directly in state and local governments. The increas-
ing use of initiatives to express preferences is a matter of
1. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927);
Jeffey L. Yablon, As Certain as Death-Quotations About Taxes (Expanded 2000 ed.), 86 TAX
NOTES 235, 235 (2000).
2. Yablon, supra note 1, at 236.
3. American voters can participate in the lawmaking process through three avenues:
initiative (direct or indirect), referendum (popular or submitted), or recall. Through the
direct initiative, citizens may propose either legislative measures or constitutional amend-
ment by submitting a petition bearing the appropriate number of signatures. An indirect
initiative is submitted first to a legislative body by the drafting/qualifying group. The pro-
posal will become law if passed by the legislative body; otherwise it is submitted to the
voters. A popular referendum occurs when a group petitions to allow the electorate either to
ratify or reject a law passed pursuant to the regular legislative process; a submitted referendum
is characterized by legislative action to submit a measure to the electorate without the inter-
vention of an interest group. See ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST
GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 15 (1999). Recall permits
voters to petition for the opportunity to remove or discharge an elected official from office.
See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 2 (1989). As such, the recall does not result in lawmaking, per se.
4. In twenty-four states plus the District of Columbia, voters may participate directly
in lawmaking through either the direct or indirect initiative. Those states have been identi-
fied in numerous publications. See, e.g., Sherman J. Clark, Direct Democracy in America, 97
MICH. L. REv. 1560, 1560 n.1 (1999). A significant number of lesser governmental entities
also permit direct participation by voters in lawmaking.
5. One commentator has observed:
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particular concern for, as Professor Sherman Clark has observed,
"[d]irect democracy, where it exists in the United States, always
trumps representative democracy [in that] [a]n initiative can over-
rule the legislature. 6 Substantively, these issues are increasingly7
diverse, encompassing constitutional as well as statutory change.
Attention to the tension between direct democracy and a repub-
lican form of governance is not new. Rather, it dates from the
earliest days of the republic. James Madison thought direct democ-
racy incompatible with republican governance. Madison preferred
representative government because it fostered consideration and
compromise of competing principles. On the other hand, popular
democracy contained no checks against self-interested govern-
ance. 9 One writer expressed the tension and explained the choice
as follows:
The Federalists rejected pure democracy for indirect
democracy, or "republicanism," not only to overcome the
problem of geographic scale, but because they feared public
acts derived from motives of "interest" or "passion."
"Interest," of course, meant self-interest, essentially the
pursuit of wealth. Non-economic "passions" might be
religious or patriotic, collective emotions of love, fear, or hate
In the first eighty years of this century there were about 500 separate initiatives
placed on state ballots, an average of about 6 a year. Now, following the 1998 elec-
tions, there have been 1,916 initiatives considered by the voters in twenty-four states
since 1902.... In 1996, there were at least 90 citizen initiatives on the ballots of 20
states, and in 1998 there were 64 in 16 states.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 2000-2001 (Thad L. Beyle ed.) 26-27.
6. Clark, supra note 4, at 1569.
7. David Broder notes that, in 1998 the initiative process was the vehicle for passing
laws and amending constitutions to "end[] affirmative action, raise[] the minimum wage,
ban[] billboards, decriminalize[] a wide range of hard drugs.... restrict[] campaign spend-
ing and contributions, expand[] casino gambling, ban[] many forms of hunting, prohibit[]
some abortions, and allow[] adopted children to obtain the names of their biological par-
ents." DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF
MONEY 3-4 (2000).
8. In Madison's view, a careful delegation of government to elected representative
would best "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a
chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country
and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 50 (James Madison) (Charles R. Kessler
ed., 1999). In this way, he continues, "it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced
by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if
pronounced by the people themselves... ." Id.
9. Julian N. Eule,Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1522 (1990).
SPRING 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
toward some group or object-that is to say, communal rather
than atomistic.
The Founders ultimately rejected direct democracy on the na-
tional level in favor of republicanism."
In those states permitting direct citizen participation in govern-
ance, the accommodation between direct democracy and
republicanism has been uneasy at best. The most recent spate of
activi 7 has been a topic of general interest in both the popular
press and the academic community. 4 Understanding this phe-
nomenon is of compelling importance, for its long-term effect on
representative governance is potentially profound.1 5 Nowhere is
the current need for critical analysis more compelling than in as-
sessing the cumulative effects of initiatives-both direct and
indirect-on the process leading to the formulation and imple-




10. Hans A. Linde, When is Initiative Lawmaking Not "Republican Government"?, 17 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 159, 166 (1989).
11. Philip B. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct De-
mocracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMErTrE L. REV. 421, 423 (1998); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31-32
(1985).
12. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 11, at 423.
13. BRODER, supra note 7, at 11 (characterizing book as "an effort to carry [the] dis-
cussion [of the initiative process] from the academic arena . . into the arena of public
discussion and political debate."); see also PHILLIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING
BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND COMPARISONS (1998); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:
CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S FUTURE (1998).
14. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 3; GERBER, supra note 3; DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1984); DAVID D.
SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989); JOSEPH E
ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY (1986); CITIZENS As LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DE-
MOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
15. This view is expressed by numerous writers albeit in varying terms. For example, in
Broder's view, "[t]he initiative process ... threatens to challenge or even subvert the Ameri-
can system of government in the next few decades." BRODER, supra note 7, at 1. To be sure,
there are others who laud the initiative as the purest form of democracy. See, e.g., Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (describing the initiative process that
amended the Colorado Constitution as the "most democratic of procedures"); DUBOIS &
FEENEY, supra note 13, at 1 (noting that "[m]any see the initiative as the very essence of
democracy").
16. James Madison recognized the fundamental importance of issues such as these:
No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would cer-
tainly bias hisjudgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay
with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the
same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation but so many
judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but con-
cerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? ... The apportionment of taxes on the
[VOL. 35:3
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Justice Black, in James v. Valtierra17 explicitly spoke to the modern
role of referenda (and, indirectly, initiatives) in addressing fiscal
concerns. He characterized the referendum as a sanctioned means
for insuring "that all the people of a community will have a voice
in a decision which may lead to large expenditures of local governmen-
tal funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues.""'
In light of what has transpired recently, this statement is pre-
scient. After all, this "voter revolution" began its most recent and
intensive phase as a tax revolt, directed against the property tax.19
The 1978 passage of Proposition 13 in California and the passage
of Proposition 21/ in Massachusetts shortly thereafter made na-
tional headlines. Both generated substantial political fall-out,2
and Proposition 13 in particular has generated a substantial
various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require the most exact im-
partiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative act in which greater opportunity and
temptation are given to a predominant party to trample on the rules ofjustice.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 8, at 47-48 Games Madison) (Charles R. Kessler ed.,
1999).
17. 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1969).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that the "modern-day romance with the ini-
tiative began on June 6, 1978" with the Jarvis-Gann amendment to the California
constitution). Howard Jarvis and Paul Gann engineered the campaign that gave birth to
Proposition 13. Id. Broder goes on to say that "Prop. 13 revived interest in the initiative
process." Id. at 7.
20. Proposition 13 rolled back and capped property taxes in California at the prop-
erty's 1975-76 valuation. Increases in assessed value were restricted to two percent per year
unless the property was sold, transferred or was the subject of construction. CAL. CONST. art.
XIIIA, §§ 1-6. Essentially, California shifted from use of the current fair market value of
property to acquisition value of property as the basis for assessment. See Amador Valley joint
Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1293 (1978) (characteriz-
ing Proposition 13 as an "acquisition value" system).
21. Massachusetts' Proposition 21h, passed by the voters in 1980, was a statutory meas-
ure that rolled back and capped property taxes at 2.5% of the "full and fair cash value" of
the affected property's 1979 value. Further, once the 1979 value had been reached, future
annual property tax levies in excess of 2.5% of assessed value were barred unless two-thirds
of that community voted for a limit override. DANIEL A. SMITH, TAX CRUSADERS AND THE
POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 86 (1998). Significantly Barbara Anderson, one of the
organizers of the successful effort said that "[w]e couldn't have done it if Proposition 13
hadn't passed in California.... Massachusetts is not as adventurous as California. Certainly,
the big argument we used was, 'California did it, and they didn't fall into the ocean.'" Id. at
85.
22. See, e.g., Lou Cannon, California Legislature Faces Huge Task in Tax Decisions, WASH.
POST, June 11, 1978, at Al; Robert Lindsey, Budget Cuts Begun After Californians Vote to Curb
Taxes, N.Y. TIMES,June 8, 1978, at Al.
23. Cronin observes that "California's Proposition 13 ... triggered similar tax-slashing
measures (both as bills and as direct legislation by the people) in numerous other states... .
CRONIN, supra note 3, at 3 (emphasis added).
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amount of scholarship. 4 Despite the increasing scope and breadth
of initiatives generally, tax and financial matters have continued to
comprise a significant percentage of the ballot initiatives presented
for voter action.
24. Smith says that over the last 20 years, Proposition 13 has spawned "dozens of arti-
cles and numerous books. [It is] probably the most-studied initiative measure in the history
of the United States." SMITH, supra note 21, at 53.
25. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 141 (1998) (noting
that "the most heavily amended sections of state constitutions are those whose restrictions
are the most severe" and that "[flrom 1970 to 1993 ... state provisions dealing with finance
and taxation-notorious for their detail and restrictiveness-were the most heavily
amended provision in every biennium but one").
The Council of State Governments for the period cited reports these data on an aggre-
gate basis-that is, without specifying direct or indirect origin-and note that the changes
described here were all of statewide applicability. While these data do not systematically
report on the subject of all initiatives during this period, some observations can be made:
(1) Initiative activity persists and increases over this period.
(2) While, as noted earlier, initiative subjects overall become increasingly
diverse, tax and fiscal policy initiatives remain a constant focus. See, e.g.,
Council of State Governments, 20 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 5 (1974-
1975) ("The most noteworthy use of the constitutional initiative during
1972-73 was the Tax and Expenditure Limitations proposal advocated
by Governor Ronald Reagan of California and rejected by the voters at
the November 6, 1973, referendum."); Council of State Governments,
23 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 4 (1980-1981) (noting adoption of
Proposition 13 in California during the 1978-79 biennium); Council of
State Governments, 25 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 214 (1984-1985)
(noting that a lull in successful activism, with no major fiscal limitation
adopted in the 1982-1983 biennium following the passage of Proposi-
tion 13); Council of State Governments, 26 THE BOOK OF THE STATES
10 (1986-1987) (noting four potentially quite restrictive initiatives (in
California, Michigan, Nevada and Oregon) in 1984-1985); Council of
State Governments, 27 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 8 (1988-1989) (not-
ing that three major tax initiatives (Montana, Colorado and Oregon)
failed to win adoption in 1986-87); Council of State Governments, 28
THE BOOK OF THE STATES 30 (1990-1991) (noting that voters rejected
two Proposition 13-type proposals (Colorado and South Dakota) in the
1988-1989 biennium); Council of State Governments, 29 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES 11 (1992-1993) (reporting more activity with mixed out-
comes for the 1990-91 biennium-initiatives passed in Oregon, met
with mixed results in California and South Dakota and failed to win
approval in Montana and Colorado-and also reporting on a number
of ballot propositions mandating or limiting spending); Council of
State Governments, 30 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 11 (1994-1995) (re-
porting the passage of the Colorado 'Taxpayers' Bill of Rights'
(TABOR), characterized as the most restrictive of the 1992-93 bien-
nium, and noting that Oklahoma and Arizona adopted constitutional
initiatives imposing "new restrictive tax procedures").
(3) After a period of relatively increased flexibility in financial matters and
with the passage of Proposition 13, constitutional amendment in this
area generally again trends toward greater restriction and lessened
flexibility. See Council of State Governments, 23 THE BOOK OF THE
STATES 5 (1980-1981) (noting that, over the 1978-79 biennia, "the
most significant and distinctive ... [changes in financial provisions]
[VOL. 35:3
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A November 5, 1998 Washington Post article reflected the
breadth of issues that had been on the ballot that year: allowed
Indian casinos to offer slots, lotteries, card games, other gambling
(California), legalized slot machines on casinos floating in artificial
basins (Missouri), passed plan to provide public money for
political campaigns (Massachusetts and Arizona), extended penny-
per-$10 sales tax to help build $360 million stadium for Denver
Broncos (Denver), approved city expenditure of $275 million on
stadium for baseball team (San Diego), rejected allowing
candidates for federal office to pledge to work toward scrapping
Internal Revenue Service and have pledge noted on ballots
(Arizona), raised cigarette tax 50 cents a pack to benefit children
and family programs (California), amended constitution so voters
must approve increases in most state and local taxes and fees
(Montana), defeated limit on state and local government taxes
(Nebraska), and defeated ban on future use of property taxes for
education (South Dakota) . 6 Eight measures passed and only two
failed.
Because constitutional amendment is deliberately made a
daunting process, voter initiative, that entails state constitutional
27amendment, is all the more emphatic. The effect of the
were proposals to limit taxing and spending by the states and their po-
litical subdivisions"); see, e.g., id. at 5 (noting that after Proposition 13
was adopted in California, the constitutions of Idaho and Nevada were
similarly [indirectly] amended (though a comparable amendment
failed in Oregon). Financial retrenchment was accomplished in other
states by imposing restrictions on government spending (Hawaii and
Tennessee), by classifying property classifications and controlling per-
missible levels of assessments tax exemptions and by prohibiting
unfunded mandates from states to local governments); Council of State
Governments, 24 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 125-26 (1982-1983) (re-
cording continued trend in 1980-1981 biennium).
Daniel Smith notes that "tax limitation ballot measures ... achieve a high degree of suc-
cess." SMITH, supra note 21, at 8. In 1996, voters in California, Florida, Nevada and Oregon
passed anti-tax initiatives. That year, anti-tax measures were defeated in only two states,
Idaho and Nebraska. Id.
26. State Ballot Initiatives, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1998, at A46.
27. The power to amend or change state constitutions has been viewed from the earli-
est days of the republic as residing solely in the electorate. While the mechanism for change
currently varies from state to state, constitutional amendment or revision may be triggered
solely by changing public perceptions of what properly makes up the desirable parameters
of government. See TARR, supra note 25, at 74-75. A principal function of state constitutions
has become the imposition of limits on state government. As such, matters constitutionally
enshrined are intended to have permanency-to forestall political change. Id. at 133. As
Tarr observes, the corruption and ill-considered nature of 19th century legislation made
"the constitutionalization of state politics ... appealing because it offered the hope of cir-
cumventing the normal political process and restricting its operation." Id. at 134. As such, a
SPRINc, 20021
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difference between constitutional amendment and legislative
enactment is obvious. Constitutional language protects interests
entrenched when the language in question is formulated.
Legislative bodies, on the other hand, may respond with much
more immediacy to current issues. Once constitutional language is
in place, it is not easily undone. Thus, long-term effects of this
popular exercise of legislative power are assured.
The issues that are the subject of debate in the financial realm
now include all manner of taxes and charges and range across the
spectrum of procedural and substantive concerns. Voters are now
deciding whether and how to (1) impose or limit existing taxes in-
cluding sales and income taxes, (2) impose and limit new taxes,
and (3) generally exercise the power to tax. s Finally, voters are di-
rectly deciding through mandated appropriations how to spend.
There is much to suggest that this fundamentally unmonitored
ballot box fiscal activity has gone too far. This seizure of control29
effects ad hoc changes in the use of financial resources and limits
with potentially crippling effect the ability of elective bodies to im-
plement a collectively rationalized financial scheme-immediately• 30
as well as prospectively. By its very nature, ballot box revenue-
collection and budgeting cannot be informed by coherent tax or
fiscal policy. Further, the effect of this continued voter attention to
financial matters might be characterized as the action of a majority
of a numerical minority of voters.' The percentage of those eligi-
cumbersome process of change or amendment quite nicely served (and continues to serve)
to bolster the constitutional status quo.
Amendment of a state constitution can be accomplished in three ways: (1) legislative ac-
tion by a two-thirds majority of both houses followed by majority voter approval through
referendum, (2) recommendations from Constitutional Commissions or conventions fol-
lowed by majority voter approval through referendum, or (3) citizen initiative providing for
ballot placement through petition. See Tip H. ALLENJR. & COLEMAN B. RANSONE,JR., CON-
STITUTIONAL REVISION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 4-20 (1962); MITCHELJ. BEVILLE, JR. &
LANCE G. BESHORE, COLORADO, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND CONTEMPORARY METHODS OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 17-23 (1978). In contrast, in most instances statutes may
be modified, amended or repealed through simple majority vote of the appropriate legisla-
tive bodies.
28. See supra note 20.
29. As Smith notes, citizens "become policy-makers for a day." SMITH, supra note 21, at
6 (emphasis added).
30. As has been noted, constitutional language enshrines interests extant when the
language is implemented. See supra note 21. Hence, when constitutional language controls,
the only direct avenue for implementing change lies through the electorate's ability to
change the constitution.
31. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 9, at 1514 (commenting on the numerical minority of
regular electoral participants and the lack of voter follow-through on initiatives and refer-
enda).
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ble to vote who actually do so is falling:s2 The figures based on offi-
cial vote counts are lower still. Those data show that, for the
overwhelming majority of presidential or congressional election
years from 1932 to 1998, less than fifty percent of those of voting
age actually cast a ballot. The percentage of those who vote on
initiatives is a subset of that group. 4 An initiative's fate may thus be
determined by a quite low percentage of eligible voters. Moreover,
in a number of recent instances, the initiative has been an out-
growth of the efforts of an economic interest group or even a
single individual rather than grassroots activity.3 Finally, even in
states where citizens have no direct ability to participate in lawmak-
ing, the fall-out from direct democracy states has been undeniable:36
there have been tax cuts in a number of these states. In addition,
various publications report continuing interest on a variety of lev-
els in the possibility of importing the initiative process into several
of those states.
32. The percentage of registered voters (relative to the voting-age population) has
remained fairly stable from 1980 to 1998 across both presidential election years (66.9% in
1980 to 65.9% in 1996) and Congressional election years (64.3% in 1986 to 62.1% in 1998).
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 300 tbl.487 (1999) [hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. However, while the per-
centage of those reporting that they actually voted remained above fifty percent in
Presidential election years (59.2% in 1980 to 54.2% in 1996), that percentage was consis-
tently below fifty percent in off-year elections-Congressional election years (46.0% in 1982
to 41.9% in 1998). Id.
33. The percentages range from 49.7% in 1932 (a presidential election year) to an all-
time low of 32.9% in 1998 (a congressional election year). Id. at 301 tbl.489.
34. While there appears to be inconclusive evidence of persistent ballot-falloff across
all elections, i.e. lower numbers of voters on ballot issues as compared to those voting for
elected officials, in general ballot issue voters are more likely to be higher-income and well-
educated. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 3, at 77-79 (noting that ballot issue voters are less
representative of the general voting population).
35. Smith offers as an example the experience of David Biddulph's Tax Cap Commit-
tee in Florida. In 1996, roughly seventy-five percent of the financial support for the measure
that limited tax on sugar in that state was contributed by the sugar industry. Two companies
alone, U.S. Sugar and Flo-Sun Sugar, contributed sixty-two percent of the total raised.
SMITH, supra note 21, at xiii. And the 1998 amendment of the California constitution raising
that state's cigarette tax from fifty cents to eighty-seven cents a pack was spearheaded and
largely bankrolled by the director Rob Reiner. CALIFORNIA SEC'Y OF STATE, 1998 GENERAL
ELECTION: LATE CONTRIBUTIONS AND EARLY EXPENDITURES, at http://vote98.ss.ca.gov/
lcrV98/c/971785.htm (last modified Nov. 13, 1998). More recently, Gov. Paul Cellucci of
Massachusetts filed a petition for an initiative to reduce the income tax from 5.95% to 5%
after lawmakers had rejected his proposal. Tom Moccia, Governor Begins Effort to Put Income
Tax Cut on Ballot, 17 ST. TAX NOTES 478 (1999).
36. See supra note 16.
37. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 217 app. II (1989) (describing, on a state-
by-state basis through 1988, the effort to make an initiative process a part of each listed
state's lawmaking authority).
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In Part I of this Article, I examine the changes that have taken
place in the last two decades in voter strategy and in patterns of
judicial interpretation. In Section I, I briefly review the history of
the property tax focusing on taxpayer reaction to long overdue
attempts at administrative reform. I show how that effort indirectly
contributed to the "taxpayer revolt." In Section II, I note the real-
ized effect of the taxpayer revolt on the property tax in particular. I
describe the impact of the newly imposed limits on patterns of lo-
cal governmental expenditure. I examine how and why broad-scale
attempts to utilize non-tax sources of revenue to maintain services
were largely unsuccessful. I also briefly explore the extent to which
change tracks voter sentiment. As a corollary to this discussion, I
examine the ongoing struggle to define a "tax," for exactions once
easily characterized as levies and charges have come under increas-
ing attack as "taxes" unconstitutionally levied. The discussion in
Section III of this part traces the expansion of voter activism to
taxes in addition to the property tax. I note the parallel emergence
of two additional tactics: the imposition of required super-majority
action-either electoral or legislative-to validate any generic tax
increase and the enactment of revenue caps. Further, I examine a
new phenomenon here: initiatives mandating expenditures.
Part II of the Article highlights initiatives' patterns of departure
from desirable fiscal policy identifying those factors inherent in
ballot-box activity that make it difficult, if not impossible, to be at-
tentive to such factors. I show how legislative activity can
accommodate fiscal policy as well as social policy while exercising
taxing and spending authority. Then, I contrast the initiative proc-
ess showing why deliberate attentive response to underlying policy
and competing considerations is impossible. I also argue here that
this voter seizure of control significantly forecloses the subsequent
possibility of competent long-term legislative financial oversight
(i.e. budget-making) in general. Next, I argue that the initiative
process impedes the formation and effective interaction of politi-
cal coalitions on either side of or across the aisle possibly causing
disenfranchisement in some cases. I assert that voter control ulti-
mately undermines the efficacy of government in general to
everyone's detriment. Finally, I question whether the trend in
More recently, in 1992, Mississippi adopted a statewide initiative, and in 1996, Rhode Is-
land voters approved a non-binding advisory question asking for statewide initiative and
popular referendum process that was acted upon by the legislature. Initiative & Referen-
dum Institute, Initiative and Referendum Historical Timeline, at http://www.iandrinstitute.org/
factsheets/Timeline.htm (last visited March 9, 2002). In 1999 the Minnesota House of Rep-
resentatives approved a constitutional amendment that would establish a statewide initiative
and popular referendum process. Id.
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voting patterns truly supports the claim that initiatives represent
"popular will." I conclude by observing that, even in the rare case
of majority voter support (majority of those eligible actually vot-
ing), the process is fundamentally flawed.
In Part III, I explore whether expressions of popular will with
regard to fiscal matters can ever be infused into representative
government without unduly diluting the former and crippling the
latter. Assuming that repeal of the process is politically impossible,
I suggest steps that might be taken by the Courts, by legislative
bodies, and by the voters themselves to make the initiative process
contribute to rather than trump representative government.
PART I
1. The Property Tax ... Before the Revolution-The ad valorem or
property tax, a levy annually imposed on the value of property, has
been the financial mainstay of local government since, roughly, the
38Great Depression. It has been asserted that "the role of the tax
has declined precipitously beginning in the late 1960s and acceler-
ating in the 1970s.""i This is true, however, only in percentage
terms. Though other sources of revenue, primarily state and fed-
eral revenue-sharing, gained increasing importance to local
government during this period, actual property tax collections in-
creased substantially throughout this period.40
By and large, state constitutional and legislative requirements
have historically mandated the use of fair market value, an esti-
mated figure administratively determined, as the base for imposing
tax liability.4 ' This consensus is not coincidental. Though admit-
tedly imprecise, market value has been generally viewed as a rough
38. Note that this has not been the result of any formal allocation of taxing authority.
Rather, it results from the preemption of income and sales taxes by the states. During the
1920s, state governments shifted from property taxes to income and sales taxes as sources of
revenue, leaving the property tax alone exclusively available to local governments. Quite
simply, the ad valorem tax was the only broad-based tax left for use by local governments.
Since that period, the property tax has been the major revenue source for local govern-
ment. SeeJOHN E DUE &JOHN L. MIKESELL, SALES TAXATION: STATE AND LOCAL STRUCTURE
AND ADMINISTRATION I (2d ed., 1994); DICK NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 6
(1966).
39. RICHARD NETZER ET AL., PROPERTY TAX ISSUES FOR THE 1980s iv (Academy for
State and Local Government, Working Paper No. 3, Tax Analysis Series 1983).
40. See data infra note 56.
41. See, e.g., HENRYJ. AARON, WHO PAYS THE PROPERTY TAX 13-17 (1975).
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proxy for ability to pay. As such, it is deemed to be an accept-
able-and perhaps the best-method of allocating the burden of
43
this tax among affected taxpayers. Distribution of wealth was no
less skewed in the 1990s. In fact, in 1998, the top one percent of
American households held slightly less than forty percent of na-
tional wealth 4
Valuation has always been an administrative difficulty in the use45
of the property tax. This is not to suggest that valuation poses the
only concern with the tax. Various accounts report a myriad of
46
concerns about the property tax. Concerns range from those
quite fundamental in nature raised by Professor Edwin Seligman
in his classic work.47 Other concerns have focused more narrowly
42. A 1973 article makes this point very nicely:
[Tihe property tax is more progressive than the income tax for one simple reason-
property is less equally shared in this country than income.... Even after acknowl-
edging that there are significantly fewer property taxpayers than those with taxable
income, wealth is still more concentrated than income. While a tenth of the adult
population receives about 30 per cent of the total income, the top tenth of the prop-
erty owners hold between 50 and 60 per cent of the real estate.
Mason Gaffney, In Praise of the Property Tax, WASH. MONTHLY, Feb. 1973, reprinted in Property
Tax Relief and Reform Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 1255 Before the Subcomm. On Intergovernmental
Relations of the Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong. 740 (1973).
43. The same article continued:
Even the plight of widows living on fixed incomes and trying to hold on to the family
homestead in the face of ever-higher property taxes doesn't undermine this argu-
ment.... Taxes average about 1 to 1.5 percent of the property's resale value. This
means that a home on which taxes are $600 a year could be sold for $40,000 or
more. This money, invested at five per cent in a savings account, would produce at
least $2,000 in interest per year-or enough money for the widow to move into a
$167-a-month apartment without touching her $1,700 yearly income or asking for
any help from her children. If the property has value to her heirs, it is likely they
would help with the taxes."
Id.
44. See EdwardJ. Caffery et al., Should We End Life Support for Death Taxes, 88 TAX NOTES
1373, 1374 (2000).
45. Numerous cases and articles address aspects of the difficulties of achieving fair
valuation. See, e.g., AARON, supra note 41; Adolph Koeppel, The Illegal Residential Assessment
Roll in Nassau County, New York, 5 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 139, 155-56 (1992) (suggesting that in
order to achieve legality in the assessment of residential property in Nassau County, the cost
approach to assessment be eliminated and that all such taxable property be assessed by the
use of market value).
46. See, e.g., Note, Tx Assessment of Real Property: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, 68 YALE
L.J. 335 (1958).
47. See EDWIN R. A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 19-32 (1931) ("Few institutions
have evoked of late more angry protests and more earnest dissatisfaction than [the general
property tax.] ... The defects of the general property tax may be treated under five heads.
(1) lack of uniformity, or inequality of assessment. (2) Lack of universality. (3) Incentive to
dishonesty. (4) Regressivity and (5) Double taxation.").
[VOL. 35:3
The Property Tax as a Case in Point
on particular aspects of the tax, including, for example, relieving• 48
regressivity through targeted tax relief, ending reliance on prop-
erty tax as a funding source for public education,49 or narrowing
the categories of exempt property.5° A discussion of these and re-
lated concerns is, however, beyond the scope of this Article.
Many, if not most, of the tens of thousands of taxing jurisdic-
tions have at some time and in a pervasive fashion failed to
annually redetermine fair market value for taxable property in a
timely, ongoing fashion. Instead of full fair market value, only a
percentage of that value has been used as the base. This percent-
age, technically referred to as the assessment ratio, varied
unpredictably within taxing units from property to property within
the same class of property as well as across classes of property.5'
While remedies for correcting these disparities varied when chal-
lenged in court, assessment ratios were often deemed contrary to
constitutionally mandated fair market valuations and violative of
equal protection guarantees.53
Administrative reform efforts during the 1970s largely focused
on correcting valuation errors. The only sanctioned departures
from reliance on fair market value, thus, were to be those permit-
ted by explicit legislative or constitutional language. The objective
was to bring valuations up to fair market value-consistent with
statutory requirements-and keep them there by adhering to the
54
required schedule of annual reassessment.
48. AARON, supra note 41, at 71-79 (discussing circuit breakers).
49. GLENN W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF THE PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA
211 (1996).
50. See D.B. ROBERTSON, SHOULD CHURCHES BE TAXED? (1995).
51. See, e.g., George Petersen, The Issues of Property Tax Reform, in PROPERTY TAX RE-
FORM 1, 11-12 (George Petersen ed., 1973); John Shannon, The Property Tax: Reform or
Relief?, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra, at 25, 29.
52. Shannon, supra note 51, at 29.
53. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm., 488 U.S. 336 (1989), is one of the
most recent examples of such a case. In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the Webster County prop-
erty assessor properly relied on original purchase price to set the initial base for all
properties within that taxing jurisdiction. However, the assessor made insufficient further
adjustments as the subject property either appreciated or declined in value as market values
waxed and waned. The failure to make these adjustments clearly contravened explicitly
articulated West Virginia law. Id. at 336-37.
The relevant language of the West Virginia constitution required that "property of the
kind held by ... [taxpayers] shall be taxed uniformly according to its estimated market
value." Id. at 337. The assessor, a state officer, was statutorily bound to perform this duty.
54. See, e.g., Mason Gaffney, An Agenda for Strengthening the Property Tax, in PROPERTY
TAX REFORM, supra note 51, at 65, 74-79 (discussing the problem of underassessment and
need for assessment reform).
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During this same period, the demands placed on financial re-55
sources available to local government escalated. Property tax
collections necessarily increased continuously,6 over an extended
period to keep up with this increased expense. Increased tax reve-
nues during this period were attributable, in part, to improved
assessment practices. 57 Inevitably, reassessment resulted in some
cases in steep and unanticipated increases-attributable to applica-
tion of a constant rate against an increasing base-in property tax
liability, a legally correct but frequently politically unpopular re-
sult. Further, increased collections were further fueled in some
states, including California, by particularly strong markets that, in
turn, caused rapidly increasing property values.5 Revenue in-
55. Since labor costs are always the biggest budgetary item, examining personnel costs
for the last two decades is instructive. The nationwide number of local governmental em-
ployees (full-time and part-time for counties, municipalities, school districts, townships and
special districts) increased from almost ten million to twelve million between 1980 and
1997. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 32, at 338 tbl.534. Payroll costs for the same period
went from approximately $10.5 million to $28 million. Id.
56. Revenue contributed by the property tax to local coffers remained fairly stable in
percentage terms from 1980 to 1991, moving only from 25.4% to 26.4% of local revenues.
TAX FOUND., FACTS AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE 234 tbl.F12 (1994) [hereinafter
FACTS AND FIGURES]. However, to put these percentages in context, in dollars for the same
period, total local revenues climbed to $612.2 million from $258.3 million. Id. at 233
tbl.F11. Property tax collections for this period climbed from $65.6 million to $161.8 mil-
lion. Id.
57. See, e.g., U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE PROP-
ERTY TAX IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED STATE STUDIES 1-2 (1974).
Recently... the clamor for property tax relief and reform has reached such magnitudes
that States are taking remedial action. As the governor of Wisconsin recently said:
Today, the State perspective on property tax reform is changing, and changing rap-
idly. In the spring of 1973, more than 30 governors promised significant property tax
relief in their "State of the State" messages; and many coupled this promise with
proposals to reform the administration and incidence of the tax itself. The political
and practical pressures behind these initiatives are clear: a continuing taxpayer's re-
volt, which has focused on the property tax because of its visibility, regressivity and
inequitable administration; a series of court decisions which has attacked tile consti-
tutionality of existing systems of school finance, based on the property tax; the
demand of a growing environmental lobby for an effective State role in local land-
use decisions; the unprecedented budgetary surpluses enjoyed by many States this
year, as a result of revenue sharing, inflation and an expanding economy.
These factors explain why, after a decade of relative inactivity, many States now are
actively working to change their tax systems.
The Advisory Commission's study provides a description of states' efforts to reform
administration of the property tax during this period.
58. Writing in 1978, Daniel Orr asserted that between 1974 and 1978, it was not un-
usual for California real estate in larger cities to triple in market value. He attributed the
appreciation to the combined effects of inflation and speculative activity. See Daniel Orr,
Proposition 13: Tax Reform's Lexington Bridge?, POL'Y REV. Fall 1978, 57, 57.
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creases could be easily offset in gross as the tax base increased by
adjusting the tax rate or, less expansively, by fine-tuning the tax
base in order to target relief. For the most part, however, neither
state legislatures nor local governments reduced tax rates during
this period. The combination of apparent local government prof-
ligacy and state legislature inaction did not sit well with taxpayers.
Local governments appeared to be overreaching. 60
State legislative bodies in a number of states attempted to re-
spond to taxpayer complaints about the upward spiral in property
tax burden in other ways. One important way of doing so was to61
classify property, according disparate treatment as deemed ap-
propriate for each class. 2 Homeowners, in particular, were favoredS 63
targets for relief. Farmers were another favored group; property
used for agricultural purposes was assessed in accordance with ac-
64tual use as opposed to the highest and best use. This was an
important concession where agricultural property lay in the path
of suburban or urban development because this location could
cause assessments to increase beyond the financial capacity of an
agricultural enterprise to defray such costs. Any or all of these ap-
proaches targeted relief without unnecessarily constraining the
revenue system overall.
Steps could also have been taken to control spending. State le -
islative bodies could have reviewed mandated expenditures
reallocating financial responsibility where possible. Options short
of gross tax cuts were available, although overall tax rates were, in
59. Id. at 57-58.
60. See id. at 59 (describing "a general perception of glut in the government sector").
61. The Supreme Court has noted that the Equal Protection Clause does not forbid
classifications, but requires only that the classification rationally further a legitimate state
interest. The governmental authority need only show that the plausible policy reason-the
legislative facts-on which the classification was based rationally were considered to be true
by the governmental decisionmaker. Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488
U.S. 336, 343-45 (1988).
62. See NETZER ET AL., supra note 39, at 1. By the end of the 1970s, "virtually every state
had acted to substantially insulate two important classes of property-farm property and
housing occupied by older people-from the full force of the tax." Id.
63. See AARON, supra note 41, at 71. Steps were taken to provide property relief to
homeowners by most states during this period through homestead exemptions, exemptions
for senior citizens and "circuit breakers." Id. at 71. In general, circuit breakers worked by
providing a refund to eligible property owners equal to the excess of property tax liability
over some fraction of income. Id. at 72-79; see also Henry Aaron, What Do Circuit-Breaker Laws
Accomplish , in PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 51, at 53, 53-64.
64. See, e.g., AARON, supra note 41, at 85-86; see alsoJohn C. Keene, Differential Assess-
ment and the Preservation of Open Space, 14 URB. L. ANN. 11 (1977); Note, Property Taxation of
Agricultural and Open Space Land, 8 HARV.J. LEG. 158 (1970).
65. Mandated (and unfunded) local services can include maintenance of a judicial
system, health services, etc.
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fact, reduced in many states. Unfortunately, however, in either
case, debate addressing fundamental policy objectives rarely
occurred.
Government expenditures were also the subject of criticism. In
California, for example, there was "widespread public concern"
about using revenue derived from the property tax "to pay for ex-
tensive programs of public transportation to achieve racial balance
in individual schools. ''67 Further, shifting responsibility for pro-
grams federal in origin to state and local governments exacerbated
this financial pressure. Financial assistance from state and federal
government to local governments declined quite dramatically dur-
ing this period as the shifts described occurred."' Local
governments were compelled to provide and pay for these pro-
grams as they were, frequently, underfunded or unfunded
mandates. Further, many of these programs were redistributive in
nature and hence, political lightning rods. Thus, political pres-
sure was an additional element.
66. Steven Hayward, The Tax Revolt Turns 20, POL'Y REV., July-August 1998, at 9
("Within two years of [the adoption of California's Proposition 13], 43 states implemented
some kind of property-tax limitation or relief, 15 states lowered their income-tax rates, and
10 states indexed their state income taxes for inflation.").
67. Orr, supra note 58, at 58- 5 9 (noting that "the rapid escalation in property taxes
was not accompanied by any increase in the quantity or quality of property-related services,
and in fact the taxes were seen by some voters as being used for purposes which are socially
non-productive or even harmful."); see also William N. Evans et al., State Education Finance
Policy After Court-Mandated Reform: The Legacy of Serrano, 89 NAT'L TAX ASS'N PROC. 366
(1996); William Fischel, Serrano after 25 Years: Are America's Schools Better and Property Taxes
Fairer?, 89 NAT'L TAX Ass'N PROC. 327 (1996); (both suggesting that Serrano v. Priest, 487
P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971), was the underlying reason for California's Proposition 13).
68. From 1980 to 1991, transfers from states to local governments ranged from 31.5%
to 29.8%. Transfers from the federal government to local governments fell from 8.2% to
3.1%. FACTS AND FIGURES, supra note 56, at 234 tbl.F12.
69. For example, during the Reagan administration, state and local governments were
directed to provide appropriate levels of subsidized Section 8 housing but were provided
only part of the necessary financial resources. This program, however, was underfunded.
See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 571 (1999) ("Furthermore, Reagan's block
grants to the states were accompanied by a 25% cut in funding, reflecting his admitted in-
tention of using block grants as a first step toward complete elimination of federal
participation in many domestic programs."); see also Harry N. Scheiber, The Direct Ballot and
State Constitutionalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 787, 799-800 (1997) ("Using the popular ballot for
both legislative and constitutional revision in the states is, moreover, a political phenome-
non whose progress has coincided roughly in time with federal aid cutbacks that produced
'Fend-for-Yourself Federalism' and attendant fiscal pressures on the states.").
70. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 2 SIGNIFICANT FEA-
TURES OF FEDERALISM (1992 ed.), 8 (characterizing federal governmental programs during
this era as emphasizing "aid going to individuals" instead of "aid going to places").
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As tax burdens continued to increase, the number of individual
taxpayer challenges to assessments rose7 ' and public debate in-
72
creased. Ultimately, taxpayer activism coalesced as a significant
political force. Increasing revenue solely through administrative
reform and judicial intervention had effectively foreclosed debate
that may otherwise have sanctioned spending to achieve funda-
mental governmental objectives. The subsequent taxpayer
outcry-and ultimate ballot box revolt-tilted the debate solely
toward relief from increasing assessments with woefully little atten-
tion accorded to policy objectives legitimately served through
public expenditures.
The California state legislature seemed particularly unable to act
effectively.7 4 In that state, the combination of increased tax burden,
perceived governmental profligacy, and ineffective legislative ac-
tion proved to be more than adequate provocation for a quite
strident wake-up call to elected officials. In June 1978, the elector-
ate implemented through the initiative a shift to "acquisition
value," a temporally-driven standard that replaced fair market
value as the base for assessment. Proposition 13 was immediately
challenged in the courts. 5 It was adjudged constitutional in the
76
California courts and ultimately, in the United States Supreme
Court.77 Note the effect of the amendment and the decision. In
71. For a description of one example of a reiterative cycle of taxpayer litiga-
tion/judicial intervention/legislative reaction during this period, see Hellerstein v. Assessor of
Islip, 332 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1975) and the notes following in JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN &
WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 103-14 (6th ed. 1997).
72. The apex of this activity was surely the congressional hearings held in 1973 into
the property tax. Though there was extensive testimony and debate, Congress ultimately
took no action. See Property Tax Relief and Reform Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 1255 Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Government Operations, 93d Cong. 1
(1973) (statement of Senator Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman, Subcomm. on Intergovern-
mental Relations) (noting that "[t]he property tax is a burning issue in city halls and in
State houses across America. A property tax revolt is indeed brewing at the local level.").
73. See, e.g., The Year of Proposition 13, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1978, at A22; see also
Scheiber, supra note 69, at 799-800.
74. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992). The California legislature enacted sev-
eral property tax relief measures during this period, including a cap on tax rates in 1972.
However, these measures were perceived to be insufficiently responsive. See John C.
Throckmorton, Note, What is a Property-Related Fee? An Interpretation of California's Proposition
218, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1059, 1060-61 (1997).
75. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d
1281 (1978).
76. Id.
77. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1. Nordlinger was brought by Petitioner Stephanie
Nordlinger, a first-time homeowner, who had bought a house in the Baldwin Hills
neighborhood of Los Angeles County for $170,000. The prior owners had purchased the
house two years earlier for $121,500. Pursuant to state constitutional requirements, when
Ms. Nordlinger purchased the house, the assessment was adjusted in accordance with the
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Nordlinger, the constitutional provision directly implicated contra-
venes generally accepted principles of taxpayer equity by
substituting acquisition value for fair market value as a base. The
reliance on acquisition value causes allocation of tax burden to be
driven by a factor likely to be highly fortuitous-time of property
acquisition-rather than current fair market value. As a result, it
became impossible for the taxing authority to deliberately treat
similarly situated taxpayers in the same manner.
The Supreme Court found that the proposition had an immedi-
ate impact at the time of its passage. It, of course, shifted a larger
78
percentage of governmental cost to newer purchasers. In addi-
tion, individual taxpayers who were then property owners received
fiscal and, possibly, psychological relief. Fiscal relief came in the
form of reduced property tax liability. For example, "[a] California
homeowner with a $50,000 home enjoyed an immediate reduction
of about $750 per year in property taxes. 7" Critical to the Court's
view, psychological relief also resulted from the initiative; for pre-
1978 taxpayers, what had been a variable expense was transformed
into a fixed one, and taxpayers' reliance interests were protected.
so
most recent purchase price. As a result of that reassessment, the property tax on the house
increased from $1246.40 to $1701, a thirty-six percent increase. Ms. Nordlinger then
learned that this liability was substantially greater than that of comparable properties. For
example, the owner of an identical house, which remained taxable on its 1975 assessment,
paid only $358.20 in property tax, a difference of $1,342.80. In effect, Ms. Nordlinger's
liability practically equaled that of an owner of beachfront property having a market value
in 1988 of $2.1 million but assessed on the basis of a pre-1976 purchase price. Id. at 7.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the Los Angeles County Superior Court grant of
respondents' demurrer to Ms. Nordlinger's suit for a tax refund and a declaration that her
tax was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal noted that Article XIIIA (Proposition 13)
had already survived a constitutional challenge. It found that this "acquisition value" system
survived equal protection because it (1) prevented property taxes from reflecting unduly
inflated and unforeseen current value, and (2) allowed property owners to estimate future
liability with substantial certainty. The court distinguished Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. on the
basis of West Virginia's constitutional requirement that "property ... be taxed at a uniform
rate statewide according to its estimated current market value." Id. at 9.
On cert, the Supreme Court felt compelled to "decline petitioner's request to upset the
will of the people of California," and affirmed the judgment of the California Court of Ap-
peal. Id. at 18. Thus, acquisition value passed constitutional muster at the highest judicial
level.
78. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 6. ("Proposition 13 has been labeled by some as a 'welcome
stranger' system-the newcomer to an established community is 'welcome' in anticipation
that he will contribute a larger percentage of support for local government than his settled
neighbor who owns a comparable home.").
79. Id. at 5.
80. See id. at 12. For this reason, the Jarvis/Gann Amendment, as Proposition 13 was
styled before its enactment, had a special appeal to those on fixed incomes. The spiraling
property tax burden had an especially drastic impact on this group. The prospect of stabili-
zation of this burden removed the specter of loss of home because of inability to pay. This is
not to imply that tax relief was the only reason to limit-there were those voters whose
dominant interest was in downsizing government. Orr, supra note 58, at 57 ("There is also
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Specifically, with property tax costs now stabilized, homeowners no
longer lived in dread of relocation financially compelled by un-
controlled property tax expense. Finally, the Court identified
possible sociological objectives served by the proposition. Im-
proved "local neighborhood preservation, continuity, and
stability"' was one such factor.
Unfortunately, in finding Proposition 13 constitutional, the Su-
preme Court sanctioned a quite undesirable tax policy. The Court
noted that post-1978 purchasers also assumed a fixed expense as of
82
their date of purchase. As noted in the opinion, however, this ex-
pense would be fixed at levels likely to spiral ever higher for
successive groups of purchasers as long as property values contin-
ued to appreciate . Post Proposition 13 purchasers were subjected
to higher assessment treatment simply because of temporal con-
siderations, not because of any underlying policy related to a
deliberate allocation of the tax burden. Thus, the practical effect
of the amendment was to shift to post-1978 property-owners any
increased governmental costs-hence the "welcome stranger"
814characterization . That this inevitable outcome was attributed to
constitutional as opposed to statutory language made the shift no
more defensible as a matter of tax policy. The change to acquisi-
tion value as a base created unbreachable insular categories based
solely on temporal considerations. Barring a downturn in the mar-
ket, there was and is simply no way for persons purchasing
property subsequent to the passage of Proposition 13 to be assured
of a property tax obligation comparable to pre-1978 similarly situ-
ated purchasers. And, over time, the differences in amounts
actually paid would become exponentially greater irrespective of
speculation as to why Thirteen succeeded so overwhelmingly: is it a harbinger of strong
public disaffection toward big government and a first step away from continued government
growth, or is it simply a peculiar and isolated response to a too-rapid increase in one par-
ficular tax?"); see also Werner Z. Hirsch, The Post-Proposition 13 Environment in California and
Its Consequences for Education, 36 PUB. CHOICE 413, 413 (1981). It is of course, impossible to
reliably know voter motivation.
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 5.
83. Id. at 6; see, e.g., Mary LaFrance, Constitutional Implications of Acquisition-Value Real
Property Taxation: The Elusive Rational Basis, 817 UTAH L. REv. 817, 817 (1994).
84. See supra note 78; see also Michael Handler, Goodbye to the Welcome Stranger Rule,
PROB. & PROP., Sept./Oct. 1990, at 13 (describing assessment practices valuing recently sold
properties at current market value while failing to assess other properties at their current
value as the "welcome stranger" rule).
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subsequent fluctuations in the fair market value of taxed prop-
85
erty.
Nordlinger validated a policy deemed rationally related to a per-ml 1 . . 86
missible state objective but at best only questionably related to
inferred objectives and undoubtedly and demonstrably unfair. The
unfairness is directly attributable to the arbitrary nature of the
classification-time of property acquisition solely unrelated to any
consideration of ability to pay. The Court itself characterized
Proposition 13 as a possibly "improvident decision[]. "s' It noted,
however, that 'judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no
matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted."88
This despite the fact that, as Justice Blackmun wrote, there ap-
peared little likelihood that this decision would be rectified by
"ordinary democratic processes." 9 In fact, from the standpoint of
taxpayer equity, Proposition 13 and its affirmation in Nordlingerare
indefensible. Nevertheless, the Court, using the most permissive
standard of review, found Proposition 13 constitutional. The Court
approved Proposition 13 notwithstanding its undeniable insularity
and its corrosive effect on taxpayer equity, local fiscal integrity, and
democratic spirit in the state.
The financial windfall enjoyed by pre-1978 property owners
might be deemed somewhat more palatable to post-1978 property
owners if it ultimately proved to be transient-that is, if advantaged
taxpayers, at some point, accounted for this benefit. Theoreticallt
this accounting could occur upon the sale of the property.
Conventional wisdom has listed property tax costs among the
factors that influence property price and that, as such, are
85. In Nordlinger, Petitioner asserted that, over the first 10 years in her home, her total
property taxes would approach $19,000. Comparatively, a neighbor purchasing a compara-
ble home in 1975 would payjust $4100. 505 U.S. at 7.
86. Id. at 10.
87. Id. at 17.
88. Id. at 17-18.
89. Id. at 18. (noting that "California's grand experiment appears to vest benefits in a
broad, powerful, and entrenched segment of society, and, as the Court of Appeal surmised, ordi-
nary democratic processes may be unlikely to prompt its reconsideration or repeal.") (emphasis
added).
90. This, of course, assumes that a sale takes place. If there is no such sale, under pro-
visions of Proposition 13 not germane to the case, (1) property owners over the age of fifty-
five who sell and relocate can take their assessment base with them if that figure is less than
the acquisition value of the replacement residence and (2) successors in interest who take
gratuitously use the transferor's assessment base as a means of determining property tax
liability. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 2. Thus, if either provision applied, there would be neither
a taxable event compelling the realization (and recognition) of gain nor a reassessment for
property tax purposes. Finally, it is not clear that a taxable exchange (reciprocal transfer of
properties) would trigger reassessment.
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capitalized.9' If this capitalization in fact occurs, the anticipated
higher property tax burden would depress market value. California
property purchasers would certainly be aware of the pending
reassessment with its attendant increase in property tax burden
and could be expected to react strategically by seeking the lowest
purchase price possible. As such, the seller would be penalized to
the extent that Proposition 13 depresses fair market value. 92 At
least one commentator has noted the difficulties of putting this93
hypothesis to the test. She observes that, in the aggregate, the
artificial constraints on the California market may undermine this• ., 94
possibility. This constraint, she asserts, results from prospective
sellers' disincentive to sell in light of the higher costs of
replacement properties. As such, the diminished number of
properties available for purchase would likely sustain or even boost
the market overall. 6 Thus, sellers motivated to sell would likely
suffer no economic disadvantage because of the post-sale
reassessment.
Alternatively, even if capitalization depresses market price, the
seller will have already realized a very tangible, quantifiable benefit
from ownership in the form of property tax burden avoided.
Without the proposition, the property tax burden for pre-19 78
property owners would have been higher than was in fact the
91. See LaFrance, supra note 83, at 862-63; see also Aaron, supra note 41, at 58. Aaron
makes the following statement in writing of the effect of disparate assessment ratios: "Varia-
tions in property tax rates within jurisdictions likewise may be capitalized into property
values, most likely when they are expected to persist. If such capitalization has been crystal-
lized in a market sale, the present owner, in reality, will not benefit from a below-average
rate or suffer from an excessive rate." Id. It then follows that an expected increase where
assessments have been stable could depress market values.
92. It is important to note that even if such an accounting were to take place, while the
property would be reassessed for future tax assessment purposes, the locality will not benefit
from any tax on the gain. Instead, the state directly benefits. Gains from transactions in
property are taxable for income tax-not property tax-purposes and income taxes are
almost exclusively preempted by the state. Increased income tax collections may accrue in
part to the benefit of localities as a result of the largesse of the state but there is obviously
no guarantee that this revenue-sharing will, in fact, take place. Revenue-sharing is very
much a state legislative prerogative. Further, any incidental transactional costs (transfer
taxes, for example) are earmarked for particular purposes and will not become a part of the
general coffers. Finally, while a reassessment of the underlying property incident to the sale
will result in increased collections for the locality, increased collections are prospective only
and will not permit the locality to recoup any part of what would have been collected had
acquisition value not controlled assessment base. The same cycle repeats during the pur-
chaser's term of ownership.
93. See LaFrance, supra note 83, at 862.
94. Id. at 863-64.
95. Id. at 864.
96. Id.
SPRING 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
case.97 But post-1978, the locality's revenue needs have not disap-
peared; they have simply been shifted to more recent purchasers.
To the extent that earlier purchasers experience a reduction in
property tax burden or are protected from a higher levy, income
that would have been used to defray that liability becomes avail-
able for some other use. It then follows that pre-1978 property
owners are not penalized by lower selling prices when the property
is sold even if the sales price realized is less than the asking price.
In effect, property value has been enjoyed throughout the years of
ownership-and without any tax accounting whatsoever. As a mat-
ter of tax and social policy, Proposition 13 remains problematic.
Notwithstanding Proposition 13's overly generous tax relief and
undesirable social and civil impact, other states shortly followed in
providing tax relief.00 Proposition 13 set off a chain reaction. This
reaction occurred in both initiative and non-initiative states as citi-
zen groups sought comparable relief and risk-averse legislators
rushed to provide it. Thus, change sometimes resulted from initia-
tive and sometimes through legislative intervention. That pattern
persists to the present. 1 As will be shown, the difference is signifi-
cant.
97. See supra note 85 for an example of the temporal effect of Proposition 13.
98. This will likely result even if there have been initial reductions in governmental
costs, as spending increases either to maintain the status quo for a larger group of consum-
ers or to provide restored or even additional services in response to demand.
99. The theory under which one might argue for imputed income on these facts is a
variation on income attribution attendant to discharge of a taxpayer's obligation by a third
party. See, e.g., Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (holding that federal
income taxes paid by the employer on the employee's million dollar salary represented
income to the employee within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code). In this context,
attribution would likely require three additional steps: (1) determining fair market value of
the affected property; (2) determining the property tax liability flowing from that value; and
(3) treating the amount above actual liability as income. Enforcement of such a change
would, for the first time, force taxpayers to account for unrealized appreciation in property
value for income tax purposes. At a minimum, even if such a result were possible within the
law as presently interpreted, the shift would pose a daunting administrative challenge. More
practically, the shift is highly unlikely on either the state or federal levels. State voters will
certainly not eagerly embrace this liability for state income tax purposes and it is unlikely
that the federal income tax code would be amended (or interpreted) to reach a problem
peculiar to a relatively small subset of states.
One faculty colleague observed that the concept of a reverse mortgage is a useful analogy
here. Instead of increasing equity through payment on a mortgage obligation, a property
owner is gradually withdrawing equity to the extent that acquisition value protects from
increased tax liability that would otherwise flow from a higher assessment base.
100. See Hayward, supra note 66.
101. See, e.g., Nicholas W. Jenny, State Fiscal Brief. 2001 Tax and Budget Summary, Fiscal
Studies Program, The Nelson A. Rockefeller Institute of Government, January 2002, No. 63,
at 2, available at http://www.rockinst.org/publications/state_fiscal-briefs.html ("In 2001,
states ended a streak of seven consecutive years of significant net tax cuts."). The shift is
attributable to the weakening of the national economy. If the present economic slump con-
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2. The Property Tax And Other Taxes ... After the Revolution-
Proposition 13's passage ignited a conflagration. Even as the post-
Proposition 13 events described above were unfolding, the anti-
property tax sentiment that had smoldered and occasionally flared
during the early 1970s burst forth in earnest.0 2 In the November
1978 election, sixteen states had tax and spending limits
(characterized in one article as "sons of Proposition 13")' ° on
their respective ballots.0 4 Citizen initiatives were successful in
several states.05 In numerous other states, legislative bodies moved
to implement changes intended to further lessen the burden of
the tax generally even as administrative and judicial reform
continued.'0" Reform activity was thus overtaken by frenetic
legislative activity (encompassing here both direct initiative and
tinues, states may well be forced for the first time in over a decade to undertake spending
cuts or tax increases. Id. at 7.
102. A contemporaneous article in Business Week predicted that "the issues originally
raised in California... [would] reverberate in all of the nation's state legislatures, and quite
possibly in Congress as well, during their next sessions." The Economic Fallout From Proposition
13, Bus. WK., Nov. 13,1978, at 101. An editorial in The Washington Post identified the taxpay-
ers' revenge as a single large and unifying theme to the midterm election campaigns being
waged for Congress and state and local offices all over the country. The Year of Proposition 13,
WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1978, at A22. While characterizing as "good news" the fact that politi-
cians felt compelled as a result of Proposition 13 to take seriously legitimate public
grievance with arrogant, overblown and blowsy government, the editorial also blasted
Proposition 13's limits on taxing as mindless and as self-indulgent as the practices which the
taxpayers were objecting to in the first place. Id. The editorial went on to lament the blown
opportunity to have that long awaited (and still awaited) debate on how to reassess the pro-
grams and redirect the energy and money that went into the legislative outpouring of the
Great Society years and their Republican aftermath. Id.
103. Susanna McBee, Prop 13 Spawns Tax-Curb Votes on 16 State Ballots, WASH. POST, Nov:
1, 1978, at A4.
104. These states included Arkansas (repeal the three percent sales tax on food and
prescription drugs); Michigan (initiatives to cut or limit property taxes); Illinois (measure
advisory to legislature to place a ceiling on property taxes); Massachusetts (local option to
employ different rates for taxing residential and commercial property); Idaho (statutory
initiative to limit property taxes to one percent of current market value); Nevada (rollback
valuation to 1975 level and limit taxes to one percent of market value); Oregon (initiative to
limit property taxes to 1.5% of value or adopt legislature-passed more limited relief); Ala-
bama (proposal to limit the increase on property taxes to twenty percent); North Dakota
(cut state income taxes for individuals and raise them for corporations); Texas (increase
homestead exemptions, targeted tax relief to the elderly and tie to state spending increases
to economic relief); Arizona (a constitutional amendment to limit state spending to seven
percent of total personal income); Colorado, Hawaii (amendments to peg spending growth
to state's economic growth, to limit state bonded indebtedness and to provide tax refunds is
surplus exceeded a specified ceiling); South Carolina (creation of a rain)' day fund equal to
five percent of the general fund budget); Nebraska (ceiling on spending by local govern-
ment and school systems); and South Dakota (a measure to require a two-thirds legislative
vote to raise sales tax or real property tax rates).
105. See supra note 25.
106. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
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legislation). All too often, legislative change took the form of
undesirably expansive relief, primarily by reducing permissible tax
rates or by imposing base limitations. Thus, even as improved
administration of the property tax gradually brought the tax into
alignment with applicable provisions of state constitutions and
statutory language (and coincidentally with generally accepted tax
policy norms), the pace of changes that undermined those norms
accelerated. Local governments were hard-pressed financially'0 8
and politically'" by the newly imposed limitations. This was the
case regardless of whether those entities attempted to expand
services, maintain the status quo or-as was true in a number of
jurisdictions-limit or eliminate services. l0
In California, where this reconstruction was most dramatically
evidenced, Proposition 13's short-term impact was initially sof-
tened on the local level by drawing down local reserves that had
accumulated as a result of increased collections (a fact that likely
contributed significantly to voter outrage)."' These reserves, how-
ever, were rapidly depleted and could not be replenished. At that
point, the state itself provided financial assistance.' The state sur-
plus was estimated to be five to seven billion dollars.' 3 This surplus
was attributed to "the effects of inflation on personal incomes and
the sharply progressive structure of the California state income
tax."114  This assistance ended when the state experienced
increasing financial difficulties. The continuing financial pressure
on the taxing districts 5 could not be alleviated (let alone rectified)
either by the legislature or by local taxing districts through further
107. SeeHayward, supra note 66.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 116-22.
109. The respective state legislative bodies control the taxing process for all units of
government-state and local.
110. See Hirsch, supra note 80, at 421-22 (noting that the secondary effects of Proposi-
tion 13 will include deferred public infrastructure repair and maintenance, declining
school budgets, labor force shrinkage and retarded economic growth).
111. The surplus on the city and county level was estimated to be as much as $3 billion.
See The Economic Fallout From Proposition 13, supra note 102, at 104.
112. See Gene Swimmer, The Impact of Proposition 13 on Public Employee Relations: The Case
of Los Angeles, 1 J. Collective Negotiations Pub. Sector 13 (1982) (noting that the immediate
impact of Proposition 13 on public sector employer-employee relations will be cushioned
for a one to two year period by the state budget surplus but will likely be felt after the sur-
plus is exhausted).
113. SeeMcBee, supranote 103, atA4.
114. See Orr, supra note 58, at 59.
115. Taxpayers may have revolted against the property tax but they simultaneously con-
tinued to demand government services. See Terri A. Sexton et al., Proposition 13: Unintended
Effects and Feasible Reforms, 52 Nat'l Tax J. 99, 100-06 (1999) (noting that "[i]n [passing
Proposition 13, voters] did not expect reductions in government services, but believed that
government could provide the same level of services with less money. Just before the elec-
tion, 38 percent of the electorate believed that state and local governments could absorb a
40 percent cut in tax revenue without cutting services." Id. at 100).
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by the legislature or by local taxing districts through further ma-
nipulation of the property tax." 6 The impact and extent of the
newly enacted constraints were manifested both directly, as local
governments made spending cuts, and indirectly, as property tax
limitation impeded collections by special taxing districts and bor-
rowing for public projects. 
1
7
Coincidentally, limitations may have heightened the regressivity
of the property tax in its remaining form and caused increased
local fiscal dependence on a variety of even more regressive user
fees and charges. "9 Relief from limitations like Proposition 13, for
example, proved most meaningful for taxpayers who move
infrequently or not at all' ° and would provide no protection from
increased user fees and charges. National data for this period
generally show a corresponding and steady increase in collections
from "other sources"-a category agregating various user fees
and charges. 121 User fees or charges, and special assessments123
116. Indeed, it may well have been illegal to do so. Proposition 13 allowed no changes
in the state taxing scheme unless such changes were approved by two-thirds of each of the
two houses of the legislature. That section bars the imposition of new ad valorem taxes on
real property. Cal. Const. art. XIIIA, § 1.
117. See, e.g., Arnold P. Schuster & Philip R. Recht, Tax Allocation Bonds in California After
Proposition 13, 14 Pac. L.J. 159 (1983) (noting that Proposition 13 impeded the use of tax
increment financing to fund community development projects by limiting the property tax
rate to one percent of fair market value and by limiting the allowable annual assessment
increase to two percent of the increase of fair market value).
118. See Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Prac-
tice 268 (3d ed. 1980) (explaining that property tax distribution is "mildly regressive,"
assuming that the homeowners tax is allocated according to ownership, renters tax accord-
ing to rental payments, and businesses property tax is allocated half to consumption and
half to capital income). When the property tax is seen as a tax on housing, its regressivity is
more pronounced. Id. at 485-86.
119. In the fiscal year 1980, local governments had total revenues from all sources of
approximately $258.3 billion. Of this, roughly $65.6 billion (25.4%) came from property
taxes, $43.6 billion (16.9%) was collected from charges and miscellaneous fees and $81.3
billion (31.5%) from their respective states. Facts and Figures, supra note 56, at 233 tbl.Fi1.
By 1996, total revenues for all states from all sources had risen to approximately $803.7
billion. Of this amount, $199.5 billion (24.8%) came from property taxes, $168.1 billion
(21%) came from current charges and miscellaneous fees, and $243.6 billion (30%) was
provided by the respective states. Statistical Abstract, supra note 32 at 330 tbl.524.
120. See Sexton et al., supra note 115, at 105-06 (noting that "[c]ompared to an ad
valorem system, the winners [in an acquisition value system] will be those with the lowest
turnover rates and the losers will be those with the highest turnover rates.").
121. Seedata, supra note 119.
122. A user fee or charge is imposed in order to defray the cost of a particular govern-
ment service. See, e.g., Bloom v. City of Fort Collins, 784 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1989). In order to
be valid as a fee, it must be reasonably related to the overall cost of the service. Fees that
exceed the cost of services rendered will be characterized as taxes. Id.
123. A special assessment or benefit assessment is a charge levied against real property
for a local public improvement of direct benefit to that property. The amount levied must
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are generally fixed without concern for ability to pay. Rather, the
revenue objective is to defray all costs of providing the underlying
service. In the face of political pressure brought by those
threatened by proposed cuts in spending as well as those who
viewed efforts to maintain or expand services as contrary to the
spirit of the newly-imposed limitations and to offset inevitable
budgetary shortfalls, public administrators sought when possible to
charge for services as they were provided.
California did not escape this trend. Property tax collections in
fact dropped precipitously after Proposition 13's passage.12 ' These
amounts, however, were offset by steep increases in collections126
from fees, user charges, and special assessments. Thus, on a
directly relate to the extent of benefit to the property. See Heavens v. King County Rural
Library Dist., 404 P.2d 453 (1965). The requirement of direct benefit distinguishes this
assessment from the general ad valorem or property tax.
124. As expenditure shifts evolved, there was much interest group lobbying for and
against various proposals. Such groups were likely, ironically, to include some who sup-
ported the proposition anticipating that reduced revenues would mean only greater
efficiency in management and not elimination of services. This is a fair inference given the
high margin of support of Proposition XIII's passage. Inevitably, there would be overlap
between those supporting the proposition's passage and those subsequently objecting to
changes in patterns of expenditure when a favored public good was threatened.
125. See Allen D. Manvel, Tracing Proposition 13 Effects, 28 Tax Notes 1540, 1540 (1981)
("In fiscal 1980, property tax collections in California amounted to about $6.5 billion. Two
years earlier, the total was over $11 billion.... These figures reflect the impact of Proposi-
tion 13 which was adopted inJune 1978"). Throckmorton notes that "[b]etween 1977 and
1986, the percentage distribution of revenue attributable to property taxes declined by
38.2% for California cities and 28.1% for California counties." Throckmorton, supra note
74, at 1063. In response to decreased property tax collections, "local governments shifted
their revenue sources" generating increases of 62.4% from "other taxes" for California cities
and 36.2% from fees. Id.
126. See Lloyd J. Mercer & W. Douglas Morgan, California City and County User Charges: A
Post Proposition 13 Assessnient, 7 URB. L. & POL'Y 187 (1985). Data analyzed by these two writ-
ers show early on a relatively small but measurable increase in the percentage of total
revenue from user charges at both the city and county level. They note that additional in-
creases may be fueled by the introduction of new user charges as well as increases in
existing charges. They opine, however, that the apparent increases may be attributable more
to efficiency improvement (pricing refinements) than actual revenue augmentation, a re-
sult that should be applauded by those wishing for greater governmental efficiency. Id. at
204; see alsoJulie K Koyama, Financing Local Government in the Post-Proposition 13 Era: The Use
and Effectiveness of Nontaxing Revenue Sources, 22 PAC. L.J. 1333 (1991). Koyama notes that
"California courts have tempered the effect of the taxing restrictions of Proposition 13 by
allowing local governments to develop nontaxing sources of revenue." Id. at 1369. These
sources include special benefit assessments and governmental regulatory and service fees.
Id.
Sexton et al. underscore the magnitude of the shift. In the last two decades, the most
commonly raised fees and new levies were "new development fees, real estate transfer fees,
business license fees, utility user fees, sewer charges, and park and recreation fees." Sexton
et al., supra note 115, at 107. For all California cities, revenue percentages from current
service charges increased from twenty-five percent in 1977-78 to forty-one percent in 1995-
96. Id. Among non-enterprise special districts (e.g., parks, libraries, police and fire protec-
tion districts), the percentage of revenue from fees increased from seven percent in
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broader level, property tax limitation relief could be and was un-
dermined by increased service driven collections. In short, relief
could be illusory.
As it turned out, these attempts to broaden the base for collec-
tions to maintain or restore prior levels of service proved
counterproductive with a restive electorate that expected the con-
tinuance of their preferred services 12 7 but considered non-tax leviesS 1281
evidence of government bad faith.
1977-78 to forty-six percent in 1995-96. Id. City revenues from property-transfer fees more
than tripled, from $40.7 million in 1977-8 to $168.4 million in 1995-6. Id.
They continue:
Another financing technique that has been greatly expanded since Proposition 13
is the establishment of special assessment districts. Special assessments are charges
imposed on property to pay for a public improvement of direct benefit to that
property, e.g., flood control, drainage, and street lighting ... Special assessment
fees collected from property owners increased more than fivefold between 1983
and 1995, from $64.4 to $401.4 million.
Id. at 108.
127. This individual voter reaction is neither surprising nor contradictory. As noted,
taxpayers did not expect reduced revenue to actually have a negative impact on services
generally and, in any case, not on their preferred services. See Susan A. MacManus, Tax-
ing and Spending Politics: A Generational Perspective, 57 J. OF POL. 607, 629 (1995)
(examining the taxing and spending preferences of different age groups, using data
from public opinion surveys, and finding that generational preferences are explained by
an individual's stage in the life cycle). Moreover, support of Proposition 13 cannot be
read as agreement to cuts of preferred services. As Professor Clark has convincingly ar-
gued, an initiative's weakness lies in its inability to register a voter's priorities. ShermanJ.
Clark, Commentaries: A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 449-50
(1998) (noting that an initiative is not "a world of isolated issues and yes or no prefer-
ences," and it does not provide what is needed-"a method of allowing people to tell us,
given that they will not get everything they want, which outcomes they want most."). In
short, populist democracy in this case could not, with the necessary precision, communi-
cate what voters really wanted.
128. See Peter J. May & Arnold J. Meltsner, Limited Actions, Distressing Consequences: A
Selected View of the California Experience, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 172 (1981):
Proposition 13 has exacerbated organizational inabilities to carry out service
functions ....
... [causing] public confidence [to] decline even further since the initiative was
approved by California voters .... The consequence of such perceptions are fur-
ther limitations on government spending and taxing ... as well as worsening
levels of discontent and confusion within public agencies ....
SPRING; 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Perhaps unavoidably, this increased reliance on such charges re-
sulted in litigation during this period over whether and how to set
fees and charges. Tax activists sought to challenge the prior juris-
prudential practice of subjecting special assessments, fees and
charges to a standard that differed from that deemed applicable to129
a traditional "tax" with mixed results. Finally, they returned to
the ballot box and passed several propositions intended to limit
reliance on fees and charges as well as general taxes.130
Thus, a number of additional undesirable consequences could
flow from imposing limitations on the general tax with subsequent
increased reliance on nontax levies. First, the general tax limita-
tions could exacerbate the tendency towards regressivity that exists
in state and local taxes in general even if increased efficiencies
could be achieved. A rate rollback, for example, imposes relatively
higher effective costs on less affluent taxpayers when the tax ad-
ministratively utilizes disparate assessment ratios instead of fair
market value as the base for assessment. And as has been noted,
mobile taxpayers will gain no benefit in an acquisition value sys-
tem. Second, use of user fees and charges, and special assessments
for public services and goods even though regressive in effect ap-
pears efficient in that costs are borne by actual users.13 ' To the
extent, however, that such goods are necessities, 13 the absence of
concern for and attention to ability to pay ushers increased regres-
sivity into the overall system. Third, especially if successful, the
combination of limited property tax collections and shifts to user
fees and charges could ultimately lead to increased disparities in
the availability of public goods. The revenue collected pursuant to
the imposition of a special levy of whatever description would of
.... This sequence of events reflects the fact that the problems faced by
organizations as a result of Proposition 13 are part of a vicious circle of declining
public confidence/revenue gaps/reduced effectiveness/declining public
confidence.
Id. at 177.
129. SeeThrockmorton, supra note 74, at 1068-76.
130. See id. at 1077-78.
131. See County of Fresno v. Malmstorm, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 782 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
Benefit assessments are not treated as taxes because they are seen as the payment of a prop-
erty owner for benefit rather than as a revenue raising matter. Although usually used to
finance public improvements, benefit assessments can be employed to pay for an ongoing
service such as road maintenance. See, e.g., City Council of San Jose v. Smith, 194 Cal. Rptr.
110 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
132. One writer surmises that against the backdrop of "basic principles of economics
and property law, in addition to ... anecdotal evidence" taxpayers are less likely to exercise
control over spending in ways likely to improve the general welfare. Stacy Simon, Comment,
A Vote of No Confidence: Proposition 218, Local Government, and Quality of Life in California, 25
ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 521 (1998).
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necessity be dedicated to a predetermined use.133 Thus, the "public
good" of necessity would be available only to those who paid the
levy. If there were no means of imposing a levy, interested consum-
ers otherwise denied the service from a public provider could
band together and form a fiscal community akin to homeowner
associations in order to avail themselves of the service. 134 The obvi-
ous outcome would leave those least able to pay without the
affected public good.135 Finally, reliance on the "non-tax" revenue
source could be limited or eliminated thus further circumscribing
financial options available to localities.
Thus, the bar was raised. What started as an effort to cabin the
property tax grew to encompass fees and charges and, as will be
discussed in the next section, spilled over to include general taxes.
As a result, this movement has had and continues to have an ever
more profound impact at the local level and, increasingly, at the
state level as various taxes, fees and charges are affected.
3. Other Taxes, New Procedural Requirements-As noted above, the
property tax has not been the sole focus of voter activism. Sales
and income taxes have also drawn fire. A favored tool has become
the imposition of a requirement for general electoral ratification
of any tax increases or a requirement for a legislative supermajori76
if changes are to be made in the revenue-generating system.
Adoption of this tactic continues. For example, as reported in
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. Washington, in that state's
1999 general election, the voters approved Initiative 695 that re-
quired voter approval for all tax and fee increases.3 3 The
Washington Supreme Court struck the initiative down in October
133. See supra notes 122 and 123 for the definitions of user fees and charges and spe-
cial assessments.
134. See, e.g., Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43
U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 254-55 (1976) (describing homeowners' associations as "Residential
Private Government[s]"). "Comprehensive services like those usually supplied by munici-
palities may be furnished by the private organization: parks, recreational, and cultural
facilities may be provided along with the more traditional services such as street mainte-
nance, snow removal, and garbage collection." Id. at 255; see also Robert C. Ellickson, Cities
and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 1519, 1524 (1982) (noting that "[i]n the case
of a homeowners association, ex ante redistributive policies are unlikely to succeed.").
135. See generally Simon, supra note 132 (assuming the public good is not being pro-
vided because of voter concern for free-riders). There is a difference between those who
could pay but opt out and those who are entirely financially unable to bear the cost of pri-
vate arrangements.
136. See Max Minzner, Entrenching Interests: State Supermajority Requirements to Raise Taxes,
14 AKRON TAX J. 43, 55-58 (1999). Minzner lists the sixteen states where a super-majority
requirement has been enacted. With two exceptions (Arkansas in 1939 and Mississippi in
1892), these are all post-1978 enactments pursuant to initiative. Id.
137. 11 P.3d 762 (Wash. 2000).
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2000 because it addressed two topics: elimination of the motor ve-
hicle excise tax and the requirement described above. 
13
This shift to required voter approval or legislative supermajority
imposes a check that can be exercised by a proactive electorate
majority uninformed of potential consequences (not necessarily
the case if the public is reacting to a legislative proposal) 139 or by a
recalcitrant legislative minority choosing to adhere to the status140
quo. As noted, the framers rejected both general and specific.... 141
supermajority requirements at the national level. Tax superma-
jority requirements both limit the size of government by limiting
revenue and entrench existing political interests.42 Other political
and fiscal effects of such limitations are considered further below.
Another popular tactic has become to constitutionally limit state
and local revenue growth to the rate of either inflation, population
growth, or both. Revenue caps differ from supermajority re-
quirements in that they limit the size of government but do not
entrench existing interests.144
Moreover, the vote is now being used proactively as well as reac-
tively. The electorate is deciding when and how to extend the
state's taxing power. Current examples, from California, include
138. Id.
139. See Eule, supra note 9, at 1525 ("[M]ost of the ways the Constitution devises to fil-
ter majority preferences are absent from direct democracy.").
140. Minzner cites to a passage in the Federalist Papers that eloquently captures the
profound difficulties with supermajority requirements:
It has been said that ... in particular cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a
quorum [ought to have been required] for a decision. That some advantages might
have resulted from such a precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an addi-
tional shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle generally to hasty and
partial measures. But these considerations are outweighed by the inconveniences in
the opposite scale. In all cases where justice or the general good might require new
laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the fundamental principle of
free government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would
rule; the power would be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege
limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take advantage of it to
screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to the general weal, or in particular
emergencies to extort unreasonable indulgences.
Minzer, supra note 136, at 43 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 58, at 396-97 (James Madison)
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)).
141. Id. at48.
142. Id. at 49.
143. For example, the Colorado constitution limits increases in tax revenues to the rate
of inflation and population growth. Id. at 56. Any excess collections must be returned to
taxpayers. Id. Nine states-California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, and Washington-have adopted revenue caps. Id. at 76 n.124.
144. Id. at 76.
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the imposition of an additional cigarette tax145 and the atVProval of
Native American ability to provide gaming opportunities.
Finally, possibly in relation to frustrations arising when the flow
or quality of public goods is adversely affected by imposing limits,
the electorate has begun to vent that frustration by mandating' 47
spending. Voters are currently seeking both to contain costs and148
to allocate resources-sometimes in the same election. These are
145. See State Ballot Initiatives, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1998, at A46. This initiative raised the
cigarette tax from $.50 to $.87 cents a pack to benefit children and family programs.
146. Id. This initiative allowed Indian casinos to offer slots, lotteries, card games, and
other gambling. I include this initiative here because, in many states, gambling proceeds
constitute an increasingly important source of revenue. From 1980 to 1998, total proceeds
from lottery sales increased from $2.4 million to $35.6 million. A significant portion of the
states' share went to education. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 32, at 333 tbl.529.
147. See generally SCHRAG, supra note 13 (describing the repeating cycles of retrench-
ment and reaction by California voters); see, e.g., KennethJ. Cooper, Ballot Initiatives Turning
to Schools, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2000, at A8 (reporting that the following education issues
were to come before voters: (1) to authorize private school vouchers of at least $4,000 per
student (California); (2) to annually dedicate a third of a percentage point of federal tax-
able income to school finance and to require the state to increase K-12 funding by at least
one percent more than inflation rate every year for a decade (Colorado); (3) to guarantee
state's per pupil expenditures remain at current level, about $6,600 (among other issues)
(Michigan); (4) to require legislature to provide sufficient funding to meet its quality edu-
cation goals or explain why funds unavailable (Oregon); (5) to allocate surplus state lottery
revenue to reduce class sizes and construct schools (Washington)); see also Voters Speak: Spend
on Schools, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2001, at Al (describing Colorado voters' approval in the last
election of the proposal to increases K-12 funding).
148. For example, in the November 1998 elections, the California ballot included
(among others) the two following propositions:
(1) Proposition 7-California Air Quality Improvement Act. CALIFORNIA
SEC'Y OF STATE, 1998 CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION VOTER
INFORMATION GUIDE/BALLOT PAMPHLET, at http://vote98.ss.ca.gov/
VoterGuide/Propositions/7text.htm (last visited May 8, 2002). Legislative
analysts estimated an annual net state revenue loss due to the new tax
credits to be, on average, tens of millions to one hundred million dollars
between 1999 and 2010. CALIFORNIA SEC'Y OF STATE, 1998 CALIFORNIA
GENERAL ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE/BALLOT PAMPHLET, at
http://vote98.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/7analysis.htm (last vis-
ited May 8, 2002). Because a tax credit reduces what would otherwise be
tax liability, the credit is the equivalent of a tax reduction. The proposi-
tion included no mechanism to offset the revenue loss.
(2) Proposition 8 - Permanent Class Size Reduction and Educational Oppor-
tunities Act of 1998. CALIFORNIA SEC'Y OF STATE, 1998 CALIFORNIA
GENERAL ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE/BALLOT PAMPHLET, at
http://vote98.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/8text.htm (last visited
May 8, 2002). Legislative analysts estimated that, if passed, the proposition
would cost the state $60 million in new state programs; potential costs to
local school districts could reach into the tens of millions though actual
costs could be considerably less. CALIFORNIA SEC'Y OF STATE, 1998
CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE/
BALLOT PAMPHLET, at http://vote98.ss.ca.gov/VoterGuide/Propositions/
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not, however, flip sides of the same coin; there is no deliberate at-S 149
tempt to balance revenues and expenditures. On the national
level, under the deficit reduction process that started in 1990 and
remains in place, the annual revenue effect of changes to the In-. 150
ternal Revenue Code must be considered. As such, for every
revenue-reducing amendment whether offered on the floor or in
Committee, there must be proposed changes in the Code increas-
ing revenue by a like amount. This is not, however, to suggest that
this balancing can easily or precisely be achieved."' The latter
point is a consideration of compelling importance at this level
since state constitutions almost universally require balanced budg-
ets on both the state and local level.' 2 Nor is there a mechanism
for redressing post-election imbalances. The combination of con-
stitutionally imposed taxing limitations and spending directives
inevitably hamstrings legislative ability to develop and oversee state
fiscal policy in any systematic way.
PART II
In introducing this Article, I wrote that the Federalists rejected
pure democracy "because they feared public acts derived from mo-
tives of '[self] interest' or 'passion.' The series of initiatives that
I have described are not universally subject to this criticism.
Rather, a number of these initiatives are at least arguably inde-
pendently defensible. Examples of such initiatives arguably include
8analysis.htm (last visited May 8, 2002). This proposition was allocative in
effect. There was no provision for offsetting revenue.
149. But see ARiz. REv. STAT. § 19-123(A.6) (2001) (requiring the Joint Legislative
Budget Committee Staff to prepare fiscal impact estimates for ballot initiative measures).
150. See Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 609
(1995):
[Slince 1986, virtually all significant tax legislation has been a revenue-raising part of
'Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act' legislation with the principal mission of deficit
containment.... The budgetary rules of the 1990 and 1993 Acts [as well as subse-
quent budget reconciliation acts] demanded that any revenue reducing measures be
paid for either through offsetting revenue increases or spending reductions ....
Id. at 611-12.
151. To put it charitably, Professor Graetz is not optimistic about the prospects for suc-
cess of this Congressional effort. Id. at 678.
152. See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 984 (3d ed. 1999) (noting
that "[miost state constitutions contain the requirement of a 'balanced budget' under
which planned spending may not exceed anticipated revenues.").
153. See Linde, supra note 10, at 166; see also supra text accompanying note 9.
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forcing smokers to subsidize anti-smoking efforts154 and mandated
increased spending for public education. Initiatives such as these
appear reasonably related to an identifiable and permissible public
objective and would likely meet the most permissive standard of
constitutional review if challenged.5 6 In fact, many if not most ini-
tiatives escape litigation altogether.
However, whether challenged or not, these initiatives, taken
together, impose substantial constraints on the ability to consider
and accommodate competing principles in the fiscal lawmaking
process. Fiscal policy is not implemented anew with each new
enactment. Rather, legislative fiscal policy-making and oversight is
an iterative process with, ideally, each new amendment or
enactment placed in an integrated mosaic. It is a combination of
painting with broad strokes and fine-tuning. Initiatives, on the
other hand, are always necessarily narrowly cast (though possibly
with broad and unanticipated ramifications); they are
constitutionally limited to a single subject. 57 The cumulative effect
of what may otherwise be reasonable individual initiative
enactments can not be considered and fine-tuned either easily or
reliably. Indeed, because of this characteristic, initiatives present
deceptively simple solutions for quite complex problems. This
apparently straightforward approach is also deceptive in another
sense. As noted earlier, Professor Clark has argued that an
initiative is by its very nature incapable of communicating voter
154. See supra text accompanying note 145.
155. See supra text accompanying note 146.
156. SeeJane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of 'Popular Intent': Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct De-
mocracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 109 (1995) (nothing that "[the] gap in the literature [regarding
the statutory meaning of direct legislation] is ... lamentable ... because many popular
ballot measures are found to be constitutional or are never challenged as unconstitu-
tional").
157. See DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 13, at 81-85; see also Clark, supra note 127, at
468-73 (arguing that the way voters vote on initiatives does not effectively communicate
voter priorities because initiatives are limited to single issues).
158. Schacter, in exploring limitations on popular foresight, makes the following point:
One can see the case for expecting legislative drafters to be aware of such things as
related and prior law, judicial interpretations of similar language, and relevant
interpretive canons that reviewing courts may apply. Whether all legislators do, in
fact, have this knowledge may be another matter, but given the staff, legislative
analyses, and other resources available to professional lawmakers, it is reasonable
enough to expect them to know something about the 'legal landscape' into which a
new law will fit. Because this is not the case with ordinary voters, many of the legal
consequences of new initiative laws are systematically unforeseeable to citizen-
legislators.
Schacter, supra note 156, at 127-28; see also Clark, supra note 127, at 471.
SPRING 2002]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
preferences with reliable precision. 15 For this reason, even if
constitutional, initiatives can do as much violence cumulatively to
republicanism as those initiatives individually found to be
animated by "religious or patriotic, collective emotions of love,
fear, or hate toward some group or object."' ° A brief comparison
of republican and direct lawmaking underscores this point.
1. Contrasting the Legislative Process with Enactment Through the
Citizen Initiative-Taxpayers' actual liability is the outcome of two
separate legislative processes: the lawmaking process that imple-
ments and oversees the revenue-generating mechanism-the
statute itself, and the budget/appropriation process that makes
allocation decisions based upon the generation of predicted reve-161
nue. Ideally, tax policy is (at least initially) attentive to equity,
simplicity, and neutrality in the tax statutory scheme.162 Of neces-
159. See generally Clark, supra note 127.
160. Linde, supra 10, at 166.
161. Consistent with constitutional mandate and on both the state and local levels,
these must be balanced budgets.
162. "The qualities desirable, economically speaking, in a system of taxation, have been
embodied by Adam Smith in four maxims or principles, which, having been generally con-
curred in by subsequent writers, may be said to have become classical." JOHN STUART MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 537-38 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884).
Adam Smith's four maxims are:
1. The subjects of every state ought to contribute to the support of the
government, as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective
abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue which they respectively
enjoy under the protection of the state. ... In the observation or ne-
glect of this maxim consists, what is called the equality or inequality of
taxation....
2. The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain and
not arbitrary. The time of payment, the manner of payment, the quan-
tity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the contributor, and to
every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the
tax is put more or less in the power of the tax- gatherer, who can either
aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor, or extort by the ter-
ror of such aggravation, some present or perquisite to himself. The
uncertainty of taxation encourages the insolence and favours the cor-
ruption of an order of men who are naturally un-popular, even where
they are neither insolent nor corrupt. The certainty of what each indi-
vidual otght to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance, that
a very considerable degree of inequality, it appears, I believe, from the
experience of all nations, is not near so great an evil, as a very small de-
gree of uncertainty.
3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is
most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A tax upon
the rent of land or of houses, payable at the same term at which such
rents are usually paid, is levied at a time when it is more likely to be
convenient for the contributor to pay; or, when he is most likely to have
wherewithal to pay. Taxes upon such consumable goods as are articles
of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a man-
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sity, the legislative goal must be to generate adequate revenue
while affording those who bear the cost of governance appropriate
treatment.16 In fulfilling this responsibility, a legislative body may
enact a constitutionally sound system that considers neither prop-
erty characteristics nor ability to pay in its design. 164 On the other
hand a state may, pursuant to policy embraced within its taxing
system, anticipate and provide for deviations of whatever kind that
effectively reallocate tax burdens.1'5 In either case, judicial "ra-
tional basis" review does not require either that the objective be
explicitly stated or directly served by the strategy employed.16 It is
enough that the strategy, i.e., relief to those on fixed incomes, for
ner that is very convenient to him. He pays them by little and little, as
he has occasion to buy the goods. As he is at liberty, too, either to buy
or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever suffers
any considerable inconvenience from such taxes.
4. Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out
of the pockets of the people as little as possible, over and above what it
brings into the public treasury ... in the four following ways. First, the
levying of it may require a great number of officers, whose salaries may
eat up the greater part of the produce of the tax, and whose perquisites
may impose another additional tax upon the people. Secondly, it may
obstruct the industry of the people, and discourage them from apply-
ing to certain branches of business which might give maintenance and
employment to great multitudes.... Thirdly, by the forfeitures and
other penalties which those unfortunate individuals incur who attempt
unsuccessfully to evade the tax, it may frequently ruin them, and
thereby put an end to the benefit which the community might have re-
ceived from the employment of their capitals. An injudicious tax offers
a great temptation to smuggling.... Fourthly, by subjecting the people
to the frequent visits and the odious examination of the tax-gatherers,
it may expose them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation, and op-
pression.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 825-
26 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1976) (1776).
163. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Margaret Richardson said in a speech to Co-
lumbia Law students on October 16, 1996: "Ultimately, I suspect, the real issue that
concerns taxpayers [is] whether they feel they can afford what they are being asked to pay
and whether they feel they are getting good value for the taxes they do pay-two issues that
do not lend themselves to easy analysis." [1996] 213 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) I-1 (alteration in
original).
164. This is the West Virginia model at issue in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, and sound tax
policy underlay the state constitutional language and legislative enactments in that case. If
executed as enacted, all taxpayers would have had the same base for tax and, in that sense,
would be treated alike.
165. For example, a legislative body clearly has the constitutional authority to utilize
classifications in order to factor in ability to pay.
166. The Court, in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992), observed that the "Equal
Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature
or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale support-
ing its classification." The Court then noted that a legitimate state purpose may be
ascertained even when the legislative or administrative history is silent. Id.
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example, be related to the approach adopted-reduced liability
for all property owners whose total income is less than $20,000 for
the year in question. The reliability of and judicial respect for the
underlying legislative judgment is derived from the process and
the opportunity afforded for broad-based deliberative participa-
tion and possible compromise leading to the formal expression of
collective judgment.
Moreover, in today's political arena, the reality is that elected of-
ficials are not the only participants in the republican lawmaking
process. Where the positive law framework creating the tax struc-
ture is legislative in origin,161 legislators, taxpayers, representatives
of the state executive branch (experts from the Department of
Revenue, for example), other government officials and lobbyists
are all likely to have had a hand in developing the framework of
state positive law by testifying at hearings and assisting with draft-
ing during the committee process. The process itself would likely
be characterized by hearings open to the public and receptive to
public input. Further insights may have been gleaned from legisla-
tors sitting as members of specialized legislative committees
charged with matters of financial oversight. Particularly in light of
the technical nature of these concerns, the committees in turn may
well have been assisted by staff having expertise in financial mat-
ters. Informal exchanges will also be a part of the process. As such,
the legislative setting would have provided ample opportunity to
consider various perspectives and possible approaches-viewpoints
that are inevitably contradictory. In winning passage of the pro-
posed legislation, coalitions could form necessitating further
compromise and concession and, importantly, the kind of delib-
eration critical to effective overall governance.
167. It is tne that this is a system that is administered on the local level and that the
revenues generated are to be expended at that level. However, the legislative role is key
since the states retain control over the format and content of the system.
168. See Peter L. Faber, The Legislative Solution. How to Get a Tax law Enacted, 18 ST. TAX
NOTES 291 (2000); see also Frickey, note 11, at 436 (quoting Alan Rosenthal, Too Much Democ-
racy, STATE LEGISLATURES, Dec. 1997, at 14, 15):
When I say the legislature is deliberative, what I mean is that most issues get airings.
Not necessarily an airing on the floor of the Senate or the House, Oxford-style de-
bate. The airing is an airing on the run, in the interstices of the process, in the
elevators and in the hallways as legislators chat with one another or lobbyists chat
with legislators. By the time an issue has either been buried or made its way through
the process, there's been a lot of deliberation, and views have changed, and people
do influence each other .... [L]egislatures do a lot better at deliberation than most
of us do in our families or in our workplace.
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Given the differing perspectives and objectives of the varied par-
ticipants, the final product will be, with some frequency, the result
of extensive consultation and compromise and could well incorpo-
rate hard-won concessions.
Likewise, the budget and appropriation processes will be influ-
enced by considerations that range from allocations driven by
mandate or the need to provide "hard services" to those that are
unquestionably redistributive in nature. It, too, is likely to be the
outcome of extensive and wide-ranging discussion and participa-
tion by legislators as well as many of those affected by the decisions
made including interest groups. The final product is likely to have
undergone considerable negotiation and change prior to enact-
ment in its conclusive form.
The opportunities for this broad-ranging participation consti-
tute both the great strength and the great weakness of republican
governance. Individual legislators are critical to the success of the
process, but individuals may be corrupt or inept. There is no guar-
antee that a variety of voices will be either heard or heeded.
Opportunity for participation unquestionably creates the risk of
capture of the process either by internal coalitions described or
external interest groups.6 9 Any and all of these possibilities exist.
The legislative process itself, however, holds participants ac-
countable. In the legislative arena, all steps in financial oversight
are increasingly in public view; broad citizen oversight is increas-
ingly the norm."70 And legislators responsible for passage of the
169. Cass Sunstein recognizes the role that interest groups play in modern regulation.
He sees this activity as falling along a continuum ranging from "cases in which interest-
group pressures are largely determinative and statutory enactments can be regarded as
'deals' among contending interests" to "cases where legislators engage in deliberation in
which interest-group pressures, conventionally defined, play little or no role." Sunstein,
supra note 11, at 48. He assesses this activity against the backdrop of Madisonian republican-
ism concluding that while contrary to Madisonian ideals it is quite likely impossible to
eliminate and must be accommodated in a constitutional fashion. Id. But see Elizabeth
Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCls. ROUNDTARLE 17, 18 (1997) (arguing
that ballot initiatives are also susceptible to interest group activity). Daniel Smith makes
much the same point. SMITH, supra note 21, at 16, 47-51 (using analyses of the "tax revolts"
in California, Massachusetts and Colorado to support his characterization of tax limitation
citizen initiatives as "carefully orchestrated faux populist moments.").
170. Again,James Madison wrote:
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing
interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen
will not always be at the helm....
The inference to which we are brought is that the causes of faction cannot be re-
moved and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.
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legislation (as well as those who may have been opposed) will be
held accountable in the court of public opinion for decisions
made or not made, possibly leading to the ultimate sanction-• . 171
failure to win reelection. In short, public oversight and account-
ability is likely with representative government.
In contrast, enactment through direct initiative does not and
structurally cannot follow the pattern described above. With a citi-
zen initiative, once the language has been formulated by initiative
proponents, the lines of debate are set. The language cannot be
subsequently modified to accommodate emerging legitimate con-. . 172
cerns. It is intentionally inflexible. The initiative may in fact
compromise accepted tax policy as Proposition 13 did by creating
unbreachable temporal taxpayer classifications without regard to
equity or to underlying policy. While there may be extensive pub-
licity and broad dissemination of explanatory materials after the
initiative is drafted, no deliberative process in the republican sense
can occur. Before the vote on the initiative, there is no opportunity
to collaboratively address broader questions of policy-here, the
desirability of creating unbreachable temporal taxpayer classifica-
tions-in the attempt to frame an appropriate response to the
range of very legitimate concerns raised, such as those by taxpayers
on fixed incomes facing the burden of rapidly escalating assess-
173
ments.
THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 47-48 (James Madison) (Charles R. Kessler ed., 1999).
171. Sunstein notes several theories that attempt to explain legislative decisionmaking.
One theory predicates legislative behavior to a considerable extent on a single-minded
determination to be re-elected. Another identifies three primary considerations, one of
which is obtaining reelection (the other two are achieving influence within the legislature
and promoting public policy). Finally, he notes that in the economic literature, legislative
behavior is attributed to constituent pressures. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 48. Importantly, in
this context, all theories accord weight to the effect of accountability when standing for
reelection. See also Raymond E. Wolfinger & Fred I. Greenstein, The Repeal of Fair Housing in
California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 753 (1968) (noting that
legislators take into account intensity of demand as well as numerical support because they
want to know the political import of disappointing one side or the other).
172. Note the other side of this: that the inflexibility is intended to provide constraints
that will (1) insure that the process of amendment does not run wild (single subject) and
(2) help voters understand the initiative.
173. Legislative history, by establishing the link between positive law and underlying
purpose, can be a useful way of identifying the state interest. However, there is no "legisla-
tive history" as the term is commonly employed available in the initiative context. The
initiative is not a true "legislative product."
There is, of course a fundamental difference of opinion on the legitimacy or value of re-
lying on legislative history. Compare Green v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-28
(1989) (Scalia,J., concurring) and Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia,J.,
concurring) (both criticizing the Court's generous use of legislative history) with Stephen
Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992)
(arguing in support of the use of legislative history where statutory language is ambiguous).
However, such reliance seems particularly appropriate in matters of tax and fiscal policy.
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Similarly, where spending is mandated by initiative, opportuni-
ties for debate and compromise after the initiative is drafted are
foreclosed. A successful initiative compels non-participatory alloca-
tive decisions. Nor is there any reliable opportunity to deliberately
consider the effects of tax reductions or spending mandates in the
larger fiscal picture. Fine-tuning is impossible. The initiative proc-
ess may also conflate the quite separate lawmaking and allocative
legislative functions. This is illustrated well by California's Proposi-
tion 10, the initiative that raised California's cigarette tax by fifty
cents per pack. 1 4 That initiative both imposed a new (additional)
tax and earmarked the revenues realized for early childhood de-
velopment and smoking prevention programs."' Passage of an
initiative is simply not the equivalent of a legislative outcome. In
the final analysis, in a world where an optimum outcome cannot
be guaranteed, the legislative process is clearly the preferable
model for decision making.
2. Impact on Meaningful Ongoing Legislative Financial Oversight:
Fine-tuning Appropriations-Ignoring for a moment the violence
done to generally accepted tenets of tax policy, this taxpayer activ-
ism, or capture, if you will, violates traditional public finance
doctrine. Capture has an obvious effect: it carves out and earmarks
portions of general funds or particular sources dedicating the
funds to a particular use. The practice thus hamstrings the general
ability to make contextual decisions and allocations. In short, an-
ticipatory allocations thwart flexibility.1 76 For this reason, the
practice is generally criticized.
7 7
This is not to say that legislative bodies have not engaged in
earmarking. In fact, every state earmarks to some extent and a few178
states earmark more than fifty percent of tax revenues. As re-
cently as 1995, the latest date of availability for composite data, on
average states earmarked twenty-five percent of tax revenues.179
Legislative history can be particularly helpful in a court's attempt to resolve any of the myr-
iad of policy and technical issues that are inevitably encountered in tax matters. In dealing
with federal taxation matters, for example, courts have relied heavily on committee reports
prepared by technicians on the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation. These reports
discuss the impetus for the legislation, language used and anticipated impact. WILLIAM A.
KLEIN & JOSEPH BANKMAN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 65 (l1th ed. 1997) (describing
technicians as "a kind of legislative civil service of tax experts").
174. See supra note 35.
175. Id.
176. SeeARTURO PPREZ & RONALD SNELL, EARMARKING STATE TAXES 9 (3rd ed. 1995).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 3.
179. Id.
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Importantly, taxes earmarked tend to be specific excise taxes
rather than general taxes. Is° A number of state court rulings sup-
port this position as a matter of state constitutional law.'8 '
Again, inflexibility is the intent and effect of some citizen en-
actments and is entirely consistent with the underlying concern
that may have motivated taxpayer activity in the first place: the
conviction that the legislature was not acting in the public's inter-182
est. Further, the data show that California had been quite
moderate in its use of earmarking; the 1995 data reveal that as of
1993 only nineteen percent of that state's tax revenues were ear-
marked.'8' The effect of citizen earmarking, however, may be
especially pernicious in the California context, for earmarking
must be considered against the backdrop of significantly increased
reliance on user fees and charges.8 4 As discussed, this reliance
alone exacerbates the existing trend towards regressivity. 8 5 Overall,
from a policy perspective, earmarking combined with user fees and
charges will quite likely reallocate tax burdens in a particularly in-
defensible manner.
Moreover, even if a given limitation or change appears reason-
able in a given moment in time, public needs and perceptions
change-sometimes even within one election cycle. Concerns that
were earlier deemed pressing now pale into comparative insignifi-
cance, only to be replaced by some new, possibly contradictory
concern, which may equally plausibly present a contrary or com-
peting financial demand.8 6 The ability to mount an appropriate
response through the republican process to the new concern may
180. Id. at 6-8. With exceptions noted by P~rez and Snell, legislative bodies generally
refrain from earmarking general purpose taxes for a dedicated objective for an indefinite
period. This is, of course, in marked contrast to the treatment accorded a special charge or
fee. This is in marked contrast to the treatment accorded to a special charge or fee; these
are generally dedicated to defraying the costs of the service provided. See discussion supra
notes 121-23.
181. A variant on earmarking excise taxes exists where the increment to general reve-
nues from the property tax resulting from specific projects is earmarked to service public
borrowing incident to costs of infrastructure improvement. A number of courts have up-
held this tactic. See, e.g., Tax Increment Fin. Comm'n v. Dunn Constr. Co., 781 S.W.2d 70
(Mo. 1989) (rejecting several arguments against the constitutionality of this arrangement).
See generally Jonathan M. Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community Develop-
ment, 56 U. DETROITJ. URB. L. 405 (1979) (describing use of tax increment financing as a
legal and economic strategy for redevelopment). But see Muskogee Urban Renewal Auth. v.
Excise Bd., No. 74,424, 1993 Okla. LEXIS 102 (Okla. June 15, 1993) (held unconstitu-
tional).
182. See SCHRAG, supra note 13, at 144.
183. PkREZ & SNELL, supra note 176, at 22 tbl.1.
184. See discussion supra notes 121-23.
185. Id.
186. Arguably, this is precisely what has happened as cuts in property tax support are
now seen to compromise the quality of public education. Id.; see also supra note 147.
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well be compromised or even foreclosed by constitutionally based
financial limitations. And this inflexibility is obviously impervious
to legislative dominant party or political philosophy change-
change that would, in a less constrained system, carry with it an
opportunity to make corresponding philosophically consistent fi-187
nancial adjustments. Nothing will be gained on these facts by
throwing the rascals out.
In fact, recent opinion polls suggest that there has been a grad-
ual shift in voters' attitudes toward government over the last two
decades. Responses suggest that voters are moving from skepticism
and cynicism to cautious investment of trust.'ss Unfortunately, the
constraints earlier imposed on the exercise of fiscal discretion pre-
clude a republican reaction to the shift. Perhaps this reality
explains the recent initiative trends from mandated tax cuts to
mandated spending. Peter Schrag, in examining the effect of these
mandates, concludes that the perceived quality of public services
remains less than what it had been prior to the revolution princi-
pally because of the inability to consider the changes in light of the
total fiscal picture.'8 Continuing voter dissatisfaction, even in light
of the shift to spending mandates instead of or in addition to tax
cuts, eloquently illustrates the difficulty with attempting to conduct
ongoing governance through citizen ballots. Ultimately, the finan-
cial inflexibility introduced through an intentionally cumbersome
process may inure to the benefit of very few and then for only what
may be a quite small window in time.
3. Impact on Political Coalition-Building-There is yet another
dimension to this popular seizure of lawmaking control. Modern
legislative political life features increasing participation by groups
187. Frickey comments on how initiatives constitute a double-edged sword for political
parties:
This synthesis of initiative campaigns, candidate campaigns, and our two-party system
... creates an unfortunate dilemma for candidates and political parties: they have in-
centives to use direct democracy as a primary driver of their own electoral politics,
but the effect is an undercutting of their institutional power as politicians. Ironically,
these candidates are using the initiative to get themselves elected to posts that the
initiative is rendering increasingly irrelevant and powerless.
Frickey, supra note 11, at 435.
188. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, RETRO-POLITICS:
THE POLITICAL TYPOLOGY (1999), available at http://people-press.org/reports/
display. php3?ReportlD=50 (reporting that hostility toward the government has been dimin-
ishing).
189. See SCH RAG, supra note 13, at 20-22, 166; see also text accompanying note 127.
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that constitute a numerical minority in the population at large.1 90
The lack of majority status in the population at large may be over-
come in the legislative arena by forming political coalitions with
other elected officials on matters of mutual concern-by engaging
in "log-rolling. ' 9 The political arena itself imposes checks on
overly aggressive individual or coalition behavior; the process of
bargaining for support is one that promotes compromise and ex-
iles those who fail to keep their word. Further, this is a public
stage; the lawmaking process is ever more open to public view. 92 In
short, bad actors can be identified. Finally, in addition to litigation
as a means of testing validity of legislative products of whatever de-
scription, there remains the ultimate external sanction-failure to
win reelection. Insofar as voter oversight is concerned, coalitions
can be held immediately accountable in the legislative arena; coali-
tions cannot be held accountable when changes are put in place
pursuant to voter initiative.
The initiative process carries significant negative implications
for legislatively-based political coalitions. The reciprocal ability to
educate, cultivate, persuade, and compromise is the heart of po-
litical give-and-take and, ultimately, inclusive governance.
Coalitions that can exist only in the legislative environment are
likely to find participation in governance constrained and perhaps
neutralized by actions motivated by unknowable considerations of
a minority of legislators and/or voters at large. Seizure through
popular control is thus particularly troubling for groups not oth-
erwise having any realistic prospect of meaningful political
influence outside of the legislative arena. The opportunity to func-
tion effectively in the legislative environment has an equalizing
190. Between 1970 and 1996, the number of black elected officials in the United States
Congress and in state legislatures increased from 179 to 617. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,
supra note 32, at 298 tbl.483. Between 1985 and 1994, the number of Hispanic public offi-
cials who were either state executives or legislators increased from 129 to 199. Id. at 298
tbl.484. And while women are not a numerical minority of the population, in 1998 there
were 1617 women holding seats in state legislatures. Id. at 297 tbl.482. We cannot know
from these numbers the extent to which women who are members of minority groups are
double-counted and there is no data reporting numbers of gay and lesbian office-holders.
Similarly, there is no aggregate data reporting on the relative wealth held by elected offi-
cials. Even within these constraints, however, legislative bodies are clearly more diverse
along racial and gender lines than ever.
191. See Clark, supra note 127, at 456-63. One context in which this coalition activity is
likely to be both critical and appropriate revolves around funding of public education. See
Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Education Opportunity, 14 J.L. & POL. 483
(1998).
192. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
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effect.1 93 Limiting or eliminating opportunities for affected groups
to attempt meaningful participation in the political arena may be
tantamount to disenfranchisement.
4. Expression of the 'Popular Will'? And Do Numbers Really Mat-
ter?-The initiative process has repeatedly been characterized as
"the people's voice." An initial question is "whose voice?" Are the
initiatives that wind up on the ballot truly the product of sponta-
neous citizen action? Several recent studies suggest that initiatives
are just as likely to be the result of interest group activity in this
setting as in the legislative forum.195 Schacter notes that the in-
volvement of "sophisticated and specialized" participants makes
the initiative process "more susceptible to strategic behavior of the
kind that is quite typical in the legislative domain." '96 Indeed, in a
number of recent instances, initiatives have been the outgrowth of
a government official's frustration over roadblocks encountered in
a futile attempt to enact legislation addressing some favored is-s e!197
sue!'9
Before a proposed initiative can be placed on the ballot in most
states, popular support must be shown through satisfaction of
some petition requirement. 1" Assuming that an initiative does in-
deed, have a grass-roots-i.e., non-interest group-origin, meeting
this requirement could be taken as credible evidence of popular
substantive support. And in earlier decades, when citizen-
organizers largely performed the task of canvassing for signatures,
the theory of debate was certainly defensible. These citizen-
organizers, however, have been largely replaced by professional
signature-collectors for whom a profit motive is significant, if not
paramount. A substantive exchange is not the collector's objec-
tive. The expense of professional collectors in addition to
campaign expenses generally has dramatically increased the cost of
lawmaking by initiative perhaps reducing to mere rhetoric the
193. See Clark, supra note 127, at 463 ("[Llogrolling cannot give any individual more
than an equal and limited share of political power. All it does is what it should do: it allows
individuals to decide how to allocate that power.").
194. See, e.g., The People's Voice, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 1999, at 45.
195. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 169, at 18.
196. Schacter, supra note 156, at 129.
197. See, e.g., 20 THE BOOK OF THE STATES (1974-1975), supra note 25 (describing then
Governor Ronald Reagan's support of an early, unsuccessful attempt to impose restrictions
on perceived governmental financial excesses in California).
198. SeeGarrett, supra note 169, at 19-20.
199. Id. at 20.
200. Id.
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assurance of control through citizen action.20 The cost of the
process and the foreclosure effect of that geometrically increasing
expense make this a prohibitively expensive undertaking increas-
ingly inaccessible to the grass-roots populace who gave birth to the
202
concept.
Is this "citizen legislators" activity ultimately typified by voter
participation as broad-based as this characterization suggests? Re-
cent data suggest that there may be little long-term fall-off in
lawmaking through voter initiative as compared to direct voting
203
for elected officials. Studies have shown, however, that in a given
election, those voting on initiatives tend to be a subset of all voters
and represent the "elite" of those voting; voter participation at this
level seems significantly influenced by the level of education at-
tained. And even here the process of educating the "law-makers"
is flawed. There must, indeed, be information widely dispersed
that explains the amendment's objective and effect in sufficientS20 ,
detail. But the quantity of information provided can be over-
206
whelming both technically and by sheer volume. Further,
information made available by advocates will be partisan in nature
and will lack the short-hand identifiers that come, for example,• 207
through party sponsorship. There will be no opportunity to
compromise in order to accommodate legitimately competing
viewpoints. Thus, if the purpose of such information and analysis
is, as it should .be, to educate and effectuate the formulation of a
solution informed by coherent policy, its objective is not being ac-
201. In the affirmative action context, where initiatives have also been used, Lydia
Chavez notes that "[w]ith the best of intentions-to give ordinary citizens the ability to
change laws-the initiative process instead permits wealthy special interest groups to bypass
the deliberative process and change laws in their narrow interest." LYDIA CHAVEZ, THE
COLOR BIND: CALIFORNIA'S BATrLE TO END AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 243 (1988).
202. Garrett in 1995 estimated the initial costs of qualifying a California initiative to
approach $1 million. Id. at 21. This amount is likely to exceed the financial reach of most
grassroots interest groups.
203. See DoBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 13, at 147 n.98 The most recent study appears to
be a Swiss study showing that citizen understanding drops as ballot measures become more
complex and that voter participation declines with increased complexity.
204. Id.
205. See generally id. at 164-80 (explaining that quality of voter participation improves
when, among other factors, voters have multiple sources of information).
206. Id. at 230.
207. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent
Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505 (1982) (detail-
ing the success of one-sided spending in elections); Schacter, supra note 156, at 130-38
(discussing the effect of the media on voters).
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complished. Finally, the ballot language itself may prove difficult to
208understand.
Because these enactments are insular events, no institutional
memory exists. The enacting body cannot learn from prior experi-
ence. If a change spawns subsequent litigation, there is no reliable
debate upon which to draw, no legislative history identifying
dominant preferences, and no coalition that can meaningfully be
held accountable if the anticipated outcome proves unattainable.2°9
Further, there is no reliable incentive to reform coalitions to try to
do it better the next time. Thus, the body politic may gain little in
what should be its continuing quest to evolve a truly representative
government. Possible disparate impact is also a concern; imple-
mentation of these instruments may have a disparate and
210
undesirable ethnic impact.
Popular governance, however, is ultimately fundamentally objec-
tionable whether disparate impact is the effective outcome or not.
Even in the unlikely case that an initiative enjoys support from a
majority of those eligible to vote in a given election, the process
remains fundamentally flawed for all of the reasons discussed
above. Without ultimate financial control in a republican setting
and the responsibility for accountability that should go with it, a
republican form of governance cannot be maintained.
208. Schacter notes that researchers "[studying] ballot questions [have] concluded that
ballot language typically requires a reading comprehension level that far exceeds that held
by the vast majority of a state's population." Schacter, supra note 156, at 139-40. David
Magleby's study of ballot language for the years 1970-1979 in California, Massachusetts,
Oregon, and Rhode Island found that voters in those states needed to read at the 16th to
18th grade level in order to understand that ballot language. Less than twenty percent of
voting adults could be expected to have attained that level of education. DAVID B. MAGLEBY,
DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 118-19
(1984), cited in Schacter, supra note 156, at 140.
209. For example, much of the background information cited by the Supreme Court in
Nordlingerv. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992), was drawn from the Report of the Senate Commission
on Property Tax and Equity and Revenue to the California State Senate. Schacter argues
that "direct democracy tests the limits of judicial willingness to deploy intentionalist meth-
odology." Schacter, supra note 156, at 110. She notes that, while courts view their task as
locating "popular intent," a number of factors may cause this search to be even more prob-
lematic than the traditional search for legislative intent. These factors include "the mass size
of the electorate; the absence of legislative hearings, committee reports, or other recorded
legislative history; and the inability of citizen lawmakers to deliberate about, or to amend,
proposed ballot measures." Id. In the absence of legislative materials, courts turn to statu-
tory text, language in related statutes and ballot pamphlets or voter guides. Id. at 111.
Schacter also notes that "the notion that voters had any intent at all on the interpretive
question facing the court-individually or collectively-is often untenable." Id. at 126. This
observation will be generally true across initiatives.
210. See generally Derrick A. Bell,Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality,
54 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1978) (arguing that referenda pose special threats to minority popula-
tions).
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5. "Taxpayers' Revolution " Impact on Non-initiative States-"Tax cut
fever" struck in most of the states, though the effect of the cuts
were blunted somewhat by virtue of a robust economy."' Revenues
increased from property as well as income and sales taxes even as
tax cuts were implemented. However, if the economy proves once
again to be cyclical as now seems to be occurring, some drop in
212revenues is to be expected. When that occurs, those states best
positioned to cope with the challenge of diminished resources will
be states in which tax cuts have not been matched by constitution-
213
ally enshrined constraints on fiscal decision-making. Legislators
should have latitude in fiscal management free of unduly disabling
constraints.
There is a clear lesson for non-initiative states: a system of unin-
formed direct action and copy-cat tax-cutting is one that serves no
one well. Lawmakers in non-initiative states must appreciate the
importance of latitude. Lawmakers should capture some reliable
sense of what issues really matter and to whom. They should cer-
tainly remain attuned to public opinion and should, where
possible and as appropriate, factor those views into the decisions
being made. But they must remain ever aware of their larger re-
sponsibility in doing so. In the final analysis, balance must be
maintained in a way that permits or encourages deliberate, not re-
active, lawmaking. The power to tax as well as to make allocative
decisions should be exercised with the greatest care by persons
fully aware of the crucial nature of their responsibility as public
stewards. Public patterns of expenditure reflect our view of society
as a body politic. I cannot overstate the importance of broad-
211. See, e.g., William Claiborne, From Surpluses to Spending Cuts: States' Poorer Revenue
Outlook, Higher Medicaid Costs May Force Belt-Tightening, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at A5
(reporting that many states are facing revenue shortfalls for the first time in more than a
decade).
212. See, e.g., Will Pinkston, States Mull Dipping into Savings: Rainy-Day Funds Built Up
During the '90s Look Tempting in Slowdown, WALL ST.J., May 16, 2001, at B10.
213. For example, in Virginia, the former governor, James S. Gilmore III, successfully
ran for office in 1997 principally on a promise to repeal the personal property tax on auto-
mobiles if elected. A strong state economy enabled the legislature to begin a phase-out of
that tax, a process that is now approximately forty-eight percent complete. However, a cur-
rently cooling state economy has imperiled continuation of the phase-out. Importantly, in
1998 when the phase-out began, the legislature specified the economic conditions that
would have to be met to keep the repeal process going. If the economy failed to perform in
accordance with projected expectations, the phase-out would be slowed or halted. R. H.
Melton, Economy Imperils Repeal of Car Tax: Gilmore Forced to Review Numbers as Revenues Slow,
WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 2000, at Cl.
214. Garrett, supra note 169.
215. See Clark, supra note 127, at 478. ("[Representation] is superior [to direct initia-
tives] because it includes information about citizen priorities and because it permits citizens
to express their opinions as well as their interests.").
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based, deliberate participation with ultimate indirect voter oversight
in fulfilling this responsibility. With so much at stake, financial de-
cisions demand the most inclusive and accommodatingS 216
deliberative process possible.
In the final analysis, the formulation of fiscal policy is unlikely
ever to be a responsibility objectively discharged in the privacy of
the voting booth against a broad view of state policy by a majority
of voting taxpayers. After all, in the words ofJudge Learned Hand,
"taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions."21 7 And
this holds true irrespective of whether the liability results from
popular or representative action. On the allocative side, consumers
want ultimately to have public spending respond to their particular
211needs and interests. In light of this, an impartial observer can
never know with any degree of certainty where individual prefer-
ence ends and group preference begins. And even if that point
could be identified, there may be no ultimate redress. After all, it is
quite impossible where legislation is enacted through initiative to
"throw the rascals out.,"21 9 Frickey's invocation of the timeless ouote
from Pogo is very apt: "We have met the enemy, and he 
is us. 2 2
216. See Frickey, supra note 12, at 444 (citations omitted):
Fair processes of law require two things. First, they must embody processes that, as
much as possible, objectively develop the relevant facts and legal standards so that
people are not deprived of important rights or interests based on erroneous assump-
tions. This is the so-called utilitarian aspect of due process. Second, they require
something more, sometimes called the dignitary interest in due process, the "promo-
tion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the decisionmaking
process." These twin interests preserve both the appearance and reality of fairness,
"generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that justice has been
done," by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the absence of a
proceeding in which he may present his case with assurance that the arbiter is not
predisposed to find against him.
217. Comm'r v. Newman, 159 E2d 848, 851 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting) (em-
phasis added).
218. See supra text accompanying note 124.
219. In writing about the impact of recent initiatives on affirmative action, Jodi Miller
makes the following generally applicable comment:
[N]o one is accountable for all of the possible ramifications of the laws thus created.
The campaigns are run by private citizens who make promises which they cannot
keep because they do not have any authority to enforce laws. They can not be re-
moved from office and they have no fear of any upcoming reelection campaign, both
of which would temper the behavior of an elected official.
Jodi Miller, Affirmative Action: 'Democracy in Free Fall': The use of Ballot Initiatives to Dismantle
State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1, 33-34.
220. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 447.
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PART III
Overall, the potential for bad policy outcomes seems to far out-
weigh the opposite potential when financial control is popularly
exercised. This is true whether this conclusion is based upon the
undesirable impact of a single controversial enactment, such as
Proposition 13, or on the cumulative effect of a number of succes-
sive benign enactments. Comparisons with taxing schemes in non-
initiative states suggest that the populist result is quite at odds with
results that would have been reached through the legislative proc-221
ess. Furthermore, the relief anticipated by virtue of departure
from accepted schemes is hardly guaranteed and may rend the fab-
ric of governance besides. Fine-tuning substitute schemes are also
likely to prove difficult when citizens act as legislators. Thus, and
ironically, instead of increased fairness and optimism about the ca-
pacity to govern fairly, public cynicism regarding the initiative
process grows. And that result is doubly tragic, for no alternative
remains. Legislative bodies have been hindered from acting while
the citizens acting directly have been unable to act effectively. The
only option is to somehow constrain the ability to directly act.
As a preliminary matter, as desirable as simply surrendering the
power to legislate in this way may be, that concession is highly
221. Again, California and its constitutionally mandated Proposition 13 stands in stark
contrast to the vast majority of American states in its use of acquisition value as the tax base.
The latter group continues to use fair market value as the basis for assessment for property
tax purposes. See Property Tax Overview, St. Tax Guide (CCH) 20-000, at 5013 (Jan. 1997)
(noting that California's use of acquisition value pursuant to Proposition 13 is the exception
to this general practice).
222. See, e.g., Michael D. Rawlins, Note, Taxation, Equal Protection, and Inquiry into the
Purpose of a Law: Nordlinger v. Hahn and Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commis-
sion, 1993 BYU L. REV. 1001 (1993). The author suggests that the arguably contradictory
outcomes in the two cases can be explained as follows: "Counsel for Webster County would
have been better off letting the Court search for that 'plausible purpose' [by stretching its
judicial imagination] rather than articulating a goal that the assessor's actions could not pos-
sibly accomplish." Id. at 1014. Further, "the law maker should also query whether the court
will summarily concoct a purpose as the Supreme Court did with Proposition 13." Id. at 1016
(emphasis added). And finally:
[T] he Nordlinger court claimed to have found the precise purpose of Proposition 13
where no single purpose existed. In actuality, the Court had a cornucopia of plausi-
ble purposes from which it could, and did, select-some happened to match the
consequences of the initiative. The result was traditional deferential rational basis
scrutiny. After Nordlinger, counsel for the government would be wise to avoid alleging
that an actual, primary purposes exists; the Court may be more likely to exercise judicial
imagination and find a legitimate purpose effected by the scheme.
Id. at 1017-18 (emphasis added).
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unlikely. Repeal would be, at a minimum, politically unpopular.
Perhaps for this reason, few commentators have advocated the com-
plete elimination of initiatives. 4 Practically, initiatives properly
structured could serve as an important safety valve and could be a225
very useful conduit for public opinion. It would be more effica-
cious to attempt to structure an accommodation between direct
democracy and republicanism such that, in the financial area at
least, legislative outcomes would not be summarily trumped by di-
226
rect democracy.
1. The Role of the Courts-State courts have historically dealt
primarily with the validity of citizen initiatives through a variety of
preliminary procedural issues eschewing substantive issues. These
issues have included such matters as verifying the integrity of the
petition process by reviewing the role of persons collecting
signatures, validating signature collected (both as to number and
credibility), and determining that the "single-subject" limitation has
227
been met. Assuming that the initiative passes judicial muster,
223. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 446 ("[T]he abolition of direct democracy... is po-
litically infeasible."); see, e.g., High Court Strikes From Ballot Proposal To Require Voter Approval of
New Taxes, [1997] 96 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at H-3. In reacting to the news that the Florida
Supreme Court had killed a ballot question that would have placed on the 1998 general-
election ballot a proposed constitutional amendment to require voter approval of any new
state or local taxes, David Biddulph, chairman of the Tax Cap Committee, expressed out-
rage at the court's action saying that the decision amounted to denying citizens their
constitutional right to change government and stymied the will of the more than 930,000
persons who signed petitions to place the proposal on the ballot. Id.
224. For example, in spite of his expressed grave misgivings, Bell stopped short of call-
ing for a ban or referenda and initiatives. (Blacks and other minorities neither seek nor
need absolute protection against the dangers they face from direct democracy. There will
therefore be no call here for a ban on referenda and initiatives.) Bell, supra note 210, at 22.
Note that there exists a group of scholars who argue that initiatives are inherently unconsti-
tutional. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking is Not "Republican Government".
The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REv. 19 (1993); Catherine A. Rogers & David
L. Faigman, "And To The Republic For Which It Stands": Guaranteeing a Republican Form of Gov-
ernment, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1057 (1996).
225. See Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation and Collective Action in Local Govern-
ment Law, 86 MICH. L. REv. 930, 930-31 (1988).
226. See Frickey, supra note 11, at 446 (arguing that direct democracy should be difficult
to use, should be targeted at obvious legislative malfeasance or nonfeasance, and should not
displace the legislative function). Clark suggests several situations that may be particularly
well-suited to direct democracy. These are (1) where agency costs of representation may be
especially high; (2) where measurement of priorities is inessential; and (3) where receiving
direct input is considered more important than measuring priorities-though a case could
be made for the need to assess. Clark, supra note 127, at 471-72.
227. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 13. For a very recent example of judicial re-
sponse to a violation of the "single-subject" limitation, see Taxpayer Protection Alliance v.
Arizonans Against Unfair Tax Schemes, 16 P.3d 207 (Ariz. 2001). At trial, Proposition 107 which
would have repealed the state's income tax was removed from the November general elec-
tion ballot. The initiative was found to have log-rolled, impermissibly combining several
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however, none of these issues reach fundamental concerns such as
the efficacy of the effort to educate voters, capping out-of-control
expenses, and illuminating and eliminating undesirable proposals.
The very troubling absence of a meaningful deliberative enactment
process suggests that state or federal courts or both undertake a more
aggressive substantive examination either by employing a
heightened standard of review of such products or by redefining
11 228
"rational basis" review in the context of citizen initiatives.
A heightened standard of review has considerable appeal. It pre-
serves the mechanism but subjects it to more rigorous judicial
review. A number of commentators have argued for a more aggres-
sive judicial evaluation. 229 However, by no means is there unanimity
on this point. A substantial number of commentators have con-
cluded that a more nuanced examination is either inappropriate,
230
unwarranted, or both.
In any event, I have reservations about the efficacy of a more ag-
gressive judicial review. Courts are simply not structured to discharge
what is, in the final analysis, a legislative function. While a court will
certainly have a greater appreciation of where an enactment fits into
the legal landscape than will an ordinary voter, the necessary fact-
finding, the weighing and balancing of interests, the determination
unrelated issues into a single ballot measure. The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed the trial court's ruling. Id. See also Kurrus v. Priest, 29 S.W.3d 669 (Ark. 2000),
where that court concluded not only that the ballot title of proposed Amendment 4 (a pro-
posed amendment to abolish state and local sales and use taxes on used goods, prohibit the
increase of taxes without voter approval at a general election, provide for a three-year stat-
ute of limitations on actions to recover taxes by the taxing authority or by an aggrieved
taxpayer) was insufficient and misleading, but also surprisingly (because rarely done) made
the substantive determination that the proposal would violate the federal and state constitu-
tions by impairing the obligation of contracts.
228. For example, notwithstanding the clear financial disadvantage temporally, unde-
niably, and irrevocably imposed upon post-1978 property purchasers, the absence of any
reasoned tax policy underlying Proposition 13, that enactment was not examined in any
meaningful way by the majority of the Nordlinger Court. The highly permissive standard of
review flowing from doctrinal constitutional rational basis analysis employed in Nordlinger
perpetuated a policy deemed rationally related to a permissible state objective, but in fact, de-
monstrably unfair. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
229. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 210, at 23. ("The courts should at least recognize that the
initiative and referendum may operate as a nonracial facade covering distinctly discrimina-
tory measures.... The evidence, both historical and contemporary, justifies a heightened
scrutiny of ballot legislation similar to that recognized as appropriate when the normal
legislative process carries potential harm to the rights of minority individuals."); see also
Eule, supra note 9, at 1558; Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial
Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 237, 239 (1999) ("[R]eviewing courts
should.., use strict scrutiny as the standard of review.").
230. See Gillette, supra note 225, at 937; see also Robin Charlow, JuDICIAL REVIEW, EQUAL
PROTECTION AND THE PROBLEM WITH PLEBISCITES, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Mark
Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 373.
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of appropriate trade-offs are beyond a court's competence. A court
will encounter significant difficulty in procedurally assessing a con-
stitutional initiative in accordance with standards used for legislative
products. And it will likely stray beyond permissible judicial bounda-
ries in attempting to do so. As I have argued, the legislator should
understand or may be presumed to understand where a particular
enactment fits in the overall fiscal picture. A judge cannot be ex-
pected to have this breadth of oversight. Thus, a substantive
examination places a court in a "lose-lose" posture.
In the final analysis, a court faces the same short-sighted binary
choice presented by an imprecise instrument as the electorate-
"yea" or "nay." It cannot modify or amend an initiative in any way. If
an initiative is approved because it is procedurally legitimately en-
acted, a crude product (comparatively speaking) remains in place.
In the words ofJudge Linde, "invalidation of some initiatives on sub-
stantive grounds says nothing about legitimate enactment of laws
that can survive judicial review of their substance.' 2 1 There is no way
to reach judicially what may be obviously desirable accommodations
designed to accomplish permissible policy objectives.
On the other hand, invalidating an initiative leaves the initial
problem or concern unaddressed and disregards the electoral will,
possibly heightening voter frustration. This outcome bars imple-
mentation of undesirable tax or fiscal policy. But it could lead to dire
personal consequences for members of state, as well has federal,
232
courts.
A further impediment exists at the federal level. Federal courts
are statutorily barred from interfering in states' tax law making
unless no adequate remedy for the wrong complained of exists
under state law. This has proven to be a formidable hurdle even
where, arguably, violations have seemed clear. And insofar as
recasting "rational basis" is concerned, the courts show no signs at
this point of requiring explicitly articulated policy when assessing
initiatives.
231. Linde, supra note 10, at 168.
232. See, e.g.,John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, 82 A.B.A.J., Nov. 1996, at 50 (reporting on the
rash of political attacks on judges for the their decisions in particular cases); see a/soJohn H.
Culver, The Transformation of the California Supreme Court: 1977-1997, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1461,
1475 (1998).
233. See The Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). The Tax Injunction Act pro-
vides that "[t]he district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or
collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had
in the courts of such State." Id. The Supreme Court has held that the Act prohibits declara-
tory as well as injunctive relief. See, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393,
411 (1982).
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For all of these reasons courts seem to be the institution least able
to effect the desired accommodation. Ultimately, judicial proceed-
ings even in their present ineffectual form, are prone to generate
voter hostility. And state court judges in particular are likely to be
politically constrained because of the limited term of their appoint-
ments. They must either stand for election or for reappointment.
Some judges have paid the ultimate price for judicial adoption of• . 234
unpopular views: failure to win reelection.
2. Legislative Opportunity-This does not mean, however, that no
options exist. In the present context, there may be limited opportu-
nity for legislative action. At least three sets of options exist. First,
state legislators could seek to increase the quantity and quality of
pre-election publicly available information premised on the general
public "right to know" by bringing more sunshine to bear on the235
initiative process. These enactments would parallel those adopted
for representative government-enactments that have arguably im-
proved the quality of representative governance. Second, legislation
intended to make the process more accessible might be enacted.
Third, post-election data might be made available.
Pre-election disclosure requirements might include the following.
The process used to satisfy the signature requirement could be dis-
closed. Such information would identify the gatherers, whether they
were paid and, if so, by whom, the basis of such payment, and total
236amount paid. Principal proponents (and opponents) could be
identified along with relevant financial data.237
Measures intended to better substantively inform the public may
also be enacted. Synopsized information relating to an initiative's
objective could be required.2 3 8 The absolute number of initiatives in
234. See Gibeaut, supra note 232.
235. Perhaps Louis Brandeis said it best: "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman." Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY,
AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 62 (1967).
236. Note, however, the Supreme Court's rejection of spending regulations. See First
Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see also DuBoIs & FEENEY, supra note
13, at 216-19; Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REv.
1845, 1873-76 (noting that suggestions made to cabin the advantage that otherwise accrues
because of the ability to use paid signature-gatherers range from an outright ban on their
use to a requirement that those using paid gatherers be required to exceed the minimum
number of signatures otherwise required).
237. Dubois and Feeney question the effectiveness of financial disclosure requirements
since "sponsorship information is rarely disseminated as widely as the political advertising to
which it relates" and "voters do not focus on statewide initiative campaigns until the last few
weeks of an election." DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 13, at 217. Professor Garrett further
observes that public financing of initiatives remains an option. Garrett, supra note 236, at
1876-79.
238. DuBois & FEENEY, supra note 13, at 113-18. This extends to both print and non-
print media. Id. at 165-82.
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any election could be limited 23" and a process for resolving an oth-
erwise ambiguous outcome where more than one initiative
addressing the same issues appears on the ballot could be crafted .4
Analysis of the impact of a given initiative (fiscal or otherwise) could
also be required. A useful addition here could include information
disclosing whether there have been prior comparable initiatives and
the outcome of those votes.
It could also be useful to require post-election disclosure of initia-
tive electoral experience-for example, number of votes cast both
absolutely and as a percentage of all voting (widely publicized) and
an analysis of voting patterns. That data would provide additional
insight into whether the effort was in fact populist as received. The
true nature and effect of the effort would thus be further illumi-
nated.
None of these suggestions, however, redresses the substantive
problems identified with the initiative process. It would remain diffi-
cult if not impossible to consider and accommodate competing
principles in the fiscal lawmaking process. Neither limiting the abso-
lute number of initiatives nor instituting a "winner-take-all" process
for resolving the problem of conflicting resolutions as Professors
Dubois and Feeney suggest resolves this problem. The contextual
conflicts described earlier are not "same-subject" conflicts, but rather
conflicts that may exist as the electorate votes, in the same election
and pursuant to different propositions, to both mandate spending
and constrain tax collections. The ability to harmonize the appro-
priations process with policy objectives would continue to be
constrained. Political participation by numerical minorities would
still be problematic. Finally, the fundamental nature of the direct
initiative would remain unchanged; it would continue to trump in-
consistent legislative products.
3. Constitutional Amendment-Direct constitutional change that
fundamentally limits the initiative process disposes of the difficulties
described once and for all. State constitutions can be amended to
limit the exercise of fiscal power by voters (assuming that complete
elimination of citizen initiative is either impossible or politically• 242
undesirable). Since most if not all state constitutions permit
239. Id. at 153-58.
240. Id. at 158-63.
241. Id. at 118-20.
242. I recognize that persuasion can forestall constitutional change. Voters in several
states have recently declined to seize fiscal control. See Tax Report, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1999,
at Al (reporting that Iowa voters narrowly rejected two proposed state constitutional
amendments). However, for each state that has, another has not.
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legislative bodies to move to amend constitutional language, the
appropriate body could suggest such change. A number of options
seem plausible. For example, a properly drafted constitutional
amendment could eliminate public power to affect fiscal matters
through changes in the constitution. Several states now have such
language in their constitutions.243 Alternatively, the power with
regard to fiscal matters could be limited to referenda'44or passage of
legislative products only. Using the referendum or moratorium as a
model, the electorate's role could be made purely reactive to
legislative products. These conduits of voter opnion are equally
definitive but much less disruptive to the process. Any and all allow
voter input into the legislative process while simultaneously
affording the affected legislative body an opportunity for reflection
and deliberate legislative reaction. Another possibility is to require a
supermajority of all those voting for enactment of public
246,instruments (but simple majority for legislative action). Further,
Professor Clark has suggested that the process itself might be
modified in order to make it more sensitive to voter priorities. This
might be done by using cumulative plebiscitary voting or multi-issue
ballots offering a choice from quite different possibilities.2 4 7 Finally,
sunset provisions could be made a part of such enactments.248
Finally, if the power remains uncurbed in any of the ways sug-
gested, it may be tempered by changing its immediate effect. Briefly,
instead of treating such enactments as self-executing, they could be
recharacterized pursuant to appropriate constitutional amendatory
language as instructions to the appropriate legislative body-
243. The Alaska constitution, for example, bans the use of initiatives to make appro-
priations. ALAsKA CONST. art. XI, § 7.
244. That is: through the use of the indirect initiatives akin to those historically used for
the validation of general obligation bonds.
245. Eule, suspra note 9, at 1574-75 (finding such participation fundamentally different
from unfiltered products).
246. In the same vein, Frickey notes several suggestions for restructuring the direct ini-
tiative: (1) to limit the state constitutional amendment process to matters of governmental
structure, organization, and powers, and to the basic rights of persons against their govern-
ment; (2) to require initial referral of constitutional amendments first to the legislature for
consideration with approval predicated on meeting a voter supermajority requirement of
sixty percent; or (3) that constitutional amendments be referred to the legislature with no
ballot-box budgeting. Frickey, supra note 11, at 446.
247. SeeClark, supra note 127, at 471.
248. The best and most recent example of the use of sunsetting provisions, albeit on
the federal level, is drawn from the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). That act
makes changes in the federal tax code, the vast majority of which will disappear for tax years
beginning after December 31, 2001 if Congress does not take additional action during the
interim period.
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possibly with a delayed fuse. 4: If the legislative body failed to take
appropriate action within some reasonable period (perhaps over the
course of one legislative session), the enactment would take effect.
Under this approach, the legislative body would have the necessary
latitude to structure the "directive" (for want of a better term) in a
manner more complementary to the overall scheme of governance
thus hopefully achieving a smoother integration of electorate wishes
into the overall structure. In this way, the will of the electorate could
250
be accommodated in a less disruptive fashion.
Changes of this kind would preserve direct democracy essentially
in its present form but within more manageable limits. It could re-
sult in more credible reliance by courts on rational basis review
because the enactment will have been considered in a traditional
legislative context. The judicial branch would thus be more legiti-
mately able to do what it is constituted to do: assess and interpret the
law with the assurance that a deliberative process has, in fact, taken
place. In this framework, rational basis as a standard for review is at
least understandable if not always well-received. 25' That is to say, the
decision rendered may not be the outcome preferred by a particular
party, but the considerations supporting the outcome are less likely• 252
to have been speculative. Further, such change would enable the
legislative process to screen out more egregious "personal noise,
249. Garrett suggests public hearings and legislative action and deliberation prior to
the popular election. She also suggests financial disclosure rules in order to highlight any
interest group activity. Garrett, supra note 169, at 27.
250. Linde, supra note 10, at 170.
251. Sunstein summarizes the interaction of the federal judiciary and administrative
agencies as an attempt to diminish the authority of powerful private groups over the regula-
tory process by ensuring that regulatory decisions are reached through a process of
deliberation about statutorily relevant factors. These requirements, he says, "amount to an
effort to promote the Madisonian conception of politics and representation without accord-
ing special protection to private property or private ordering." Sunstein, supra note 11, at
85. He continues:
[T]he special role for courts might bejustified on the ground that judicial insulation
provides an opportunity for critical scrutiny of citizen preferences-in Madison's
terms, refinement and enlargement of the public view-rather than their mechani-
cal implementation. In this respect, a relatively active judicial role is designed to
fulfill the purposes of the original constitutional scheme, which attempted to insu-
late national representatives in order to facilitate the performance of their
deliberative tasks.
Id. at 86. This objective is no less compelling on the state level in the context of citizen ini-
tiatives.
252. See criticisms supra note 222.
253. As noted in the beginning of this Article, the Federalists feared public acts derived
from motives of interest or passion: economic self-interest or collective emotions whether
religious or patriotic of love, fear, or hate toward some group or object. Linde, supra note
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respond to legitimate public concerns, and permit consideration
(and where possible accommodation) of those concerns in the
process. Legislators would have a powerful incentive to consider
possible responses to the voter preferences in a fashion defined by
the requirements imposed by their oath of office. The process of
enactment and the results of this consultative undertaking are pub-
lic, and the electorate can hold the legislative body accountable for
whatever action it ultimately deems appropriate. Thus both flexibil-
ity and accountability are assured. An electorate that cared enough
to send a message through the ballot would certainly be interested
in the legislative response and constitutional considerations would
necessarily form the context for the framing of that response. All of
these concerns are of heightened importance where a carefully nu-
anced approach to legislation is dictated. That area of concern
certainly includes fiscal matters.
The lawmaking process should be open and accessible, rational
and deliberate, and policy concerns should be articulated and,
wherever possible and appropriate, accommodated. No one can
convincingly argue that the amending process that makes an initia-
tive a part of the governing entity's law is deliberate in this sense.
Unless the legislative arena is the cauldron from which such enact-
ments emerge, the range of considerations that should properly be
publicly raised and responsibly debated can never affect the final
product.
The point here is not so much that reducing the tax burden is in-
evitably unwise or that disparate tax burdens should be always
viewed as inherently unfair. Rather, this discussion relates to the
process for making taxing and allocative decisions. Unfairness may
be legislatively deemed a secondary concern, and is certainly an is-
sue of less than constitutional import. After all, there is no
constitutional requirement that law be fair in order to be rational."'
When fiscal policy is at issue, however, every effort should be made
to accommodate what may be disparate interests within a framework
encouraging more, not less, deliberation. Revenue systems and
budgetary allocations of necessity ultimately rely upon a perception
of rationality for long-term acceptance. Otherwise, their survival be-
comes imperiled, for citizen confidence in the competency of
government is adversely affected-especially where there are, as
here, clear winners and losers.
10, at 166-69. While the possibility of such animus can never be eliminated, the effect is far
more likely diminished in a republican setting. Id. at 169-72.
254. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (noting that, as a general rule,
"legislators are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.").
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CONCLUSION
If it were possible to eliminate the property tax then the problems
discussed here would disappear to that extent. The property tax,
however, of necessity remains well entrenched. 5 The economic
press of recent events suggests that the tax has heightened, not less-
ened, importance. The central role of the legislature in grappling
with the state and local fiscal situation cannot be ignored. State con-
stitutions place limits on the tax base, the tax rate, and local budget
management generally. A realistic assessment of the effect of such
limitations leads inexorably to the conclusion that the legislature
should properly be accorded maximum latitude for responding to
governmental economic burdens. This proposal maintains that legis-
lative role even as it responsibly accommodates democratic input.
The property tax is a very important part of the system of
governmental finance. It is, however, only a part of a system, which is,
increasingly, an interdependent one. A better-administered tax will
likely improve local finance but is by no means a panacea.
Meaningful reform, if it is be successful over the long term, must
take that into account and must be reflective of informed collective
judgment embracing financial considerations generally. Reform
should not result from the action of a rump coalition acting
pursuant to a myriad of concealed considerations. Even if voter
initiatives are structurally perfect, time is needed to debate, reflect,
and adjust for important policy reasons as well as to adjust to the
mandate for change.
The most unfortunate aspect of the popular seizure of fiscal
control, thus, is its effect on the larger debate that should be taking
place. The present debate, cast in terms of mechanics and
immediate tax burden, would much more usefully focus on an
examination of the larger question: what is organized government
prepared to pay for and on what level? This is a complex question
involving several subparts. These sub-issues include the following:
(1) What tax and how is it to work? (2) To what use should proceeds
be put? And for what length of time? (3) How does the nature of the
tax affect allocation decision-making and where should final
authority to decide reside? This is an analysis that has never taken
place in a coherent, direct fashion. The dimensions of the debate
have been changed by rampant constitutional amendment that
255. See data supra note 51.
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hobble the ability to ultimately make reasoned decisions and all too
256often drive the debate in non-initiative as well as initiative states.
The continuing downward shift of the financial burden has made
necessary a close, increasingly painful, contentious examination of
state and local fiscal policy. Driven by the changes now well under-
way, the system is becoming one that cannot be made to respond to
these characteristics in light of capture by a numerical minority un-
motivated to participate in a republican system of governance. It is
also becoming a part of the problem-a system that is ever more
regressive and exacerbates the entrenched and exponentially ex-
ploding differences in wealth in this country. 57 It is unacceptable for
either organized bodies of governance or rump voter majorities to
seize control of fiscal machinery recklessly abdicating responsibility
for funding government-inappropriately compromising equity in
taxpayer treatment, and reallocating public revenues in the absence
of a meaningful debate. The imbalances certain to emanate from
this appropriation of power and abdication of republican govern-
ance pose a major threat to the political consensus on which both
local and state governments necessarily rests. How we as a nation tax
ourselves and spend common resources says a very great deal about
our self-view of what a civilized society means. We ignore this brood-
ing fiscal crisis at our own peril.
256. See generally, PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM, (1995). Sexton et al.
also speak to this:
Our final recommendation is for a fresh look at the fiscal relationship between the
state and local governments. The current system of intergovernmental grants and
mandates is a convoluted mix of short-term quick fixes. The only apparent policy ra-
tionale for the current system is that each rule appeared to be expedient at the time
it was implemented. Over time, the layering of these rules has generated a system
that cannot be understood, much less defended on policy grounds. The state should
develop a new system of intergovernmental grants and mandates, one that recog-
nizes the current budgetary and judicial realities and is true to the principles of fiscal
federalism.
Sexton et al., supra note 115, at 110.
257. See EdwardJ. Caffery et al., supra note 44, at 1374:
The share of [Adjusted Gross Income] reported by persons having more than
$200,000 of AGI, making up 1.6 percent of the people filing returns, increased from
14.5 percent in 1993 to 21.6 percent in 1998. Those with 1998 AGI exceeding $1 mil-
lion saw their share of AGI almost double from 4.9 percent of the total on 1993
returns to 9.3 percent on 1998 returns.
In these same seven years .... wealth has become more tightly concentrated. A little
less than 40 percent of it is now held by the top 1 percent of households.
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